




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

















THE REVIEW

OF

General Sherman's Memoirs

EXAMINED,

CHIEFLY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE.

C. W. MOULTON,

CINCINNATI, O.

Library of  
City of Washington

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## PREFACE.

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The preparation of this pamphlet has been undertaken and completed in such moments as could be spared from daily occupations in the courts.


To fully discuss all the points raised in the review of Sherman's Memoirs, has not been attempted. To do this would necessitate full access to the records of the War Department, and more time than I can command. The only endeavor has been to show that the documents published in the Review are, almost alone, sufficient for the refutation of the graver charges against General Sherman.

I have been materially aided in this matter by my friend, Florien Giauque, Esq., of this city. With this exception, no person but myself is responsible for the publication of this pamphlet.

CINCINNATI, 1875.

With the Compliments of

THE AUTHOR.



## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTORY.

The examination of this work<sup>1</sup> was undertaken with no little interest, because the promises of its author had led me to believe that he intended to correct the Memoirs by the light of the records which appear to have been so generously opened to him. But the perusal of even a few of its pages must satisfy any impartial reader that its author writes in a spirit bitterly hostile to General Sherman; and the examination of the entire work will convince him that not only do the records he cites often fail to sustain the propositions they are intended to prove, but that frequently they contradict them. To show that either this frame of mind has warped this reviewer's judgment, or that he has deliberately made false statements, and sought to ingeniously sustain them by an unfair presentation of records, is one of the objects of this pamphlet. It might, perhaps, be profitably borne in mind that even these records are the reports, orders, letters, etc., of persons who, no matter what their rank, were nevertheless *fallible men*, with more or less imperfect means for obtaining correct information, and that they would have been more than human had their productions been always untinged by prejudice or by the desire to set forth their own acts in a favorable light before their superiors and the public. General Sherman was one of these men; but the fact that he was a prominent one, and has written his recollections of men and events of the war, is no reason why he should be attacked in an unfair or hostile spirit. That General Sherman has been unjust or unfair to his brother officers, subordinates, or superiors, is what his assailant fails to show.

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<sup>1</sup> Sherman's Historical Raid. The Memoirs in the light of the Record. A review based upon compilations from the files of the War Office. By H. V. Boynton.

It should also be borne in mind that the Memoirs do not purport to be a complete history even of the transactions to which they refer, but are narrative statements, made by the author, of facts which came more or less completely within his personal knowledge. There are thousands of officers beside Sherman who could give the public an interesting narrative of their personal recollections and experiences, which would doubtless bring to light a great mass of facts hitherto unknown; and, although such narratives are not of themselves history, they are the material out of which correct history can best be written. It is to be regretted that these officers do not collect and publish their contributions to this material. It is well known that many things, important in their bearing on events, never reach the light through official sources, sometimes to the glorification of the undeserving and to the injustice of the meritorious. Our people and posterity have a far greater interest in the truth of history than in the reputation of any man or set of men, if such reputations have not been fairly earned. But, on the other hand, all citizens have a claim and an interest in the deserved honors of their nation's illustrious men, and he who seeks to unjustly tarnish their fair fame strikes at that nation's greatness and at that people's common inheritance. If all are judged in accordance with the above, there can be no complaint.

But, for some different reason not generally understood, this reviewer, as the Washington correspondent of the *Cincinnati Gazette*, embarked, in his letters to that paper, in an attack upon General Sherman and his Memoirs, and from these letters compiled this book. It is gratifying to know that he, at least, was able to obtain copies of the official records!

Much of the running commentary which is interspersed, as their author says, to connect and explain the record, is interesting, not only for the reason claimed to be its purpose, but also because it discloses the spirit in which the book is written. These comments need no interpreter. They are easily comprehended.

Among his first statements, he asserts that the Memoirs are "egotistical," "unreliable, and unjust;" and that their author "detracts from what rightfully belongs to Grant;" "misrepresents and belittles Thomas; withholds justice from Buell; repeatedly loads failures for which he was responsible, now upon Thomas, now upon Schofield, now upon McPherson, and again upon the three jointly; is unjust in the extreme to Rosecrans; sneers at Logan and Blair; insults Hooker, and slanders Stanton;" and further, in effect, that, as a military commander, he was careless and incapable; that he betrayed the trust confided in him by a political surrender to the Confederate General Johnston. In summing up his case against him, at the conclusion of his book, the reviewer reiterates most of these charges, and adds to them several others, which, he says, are proven by the official files.

These statements are broad enough to attract attention, especially when made under such circumstances and in such connection as to almost create the impression that the book is the indirect production of the War Department. This impression is strengthened by the fact that there is a certain *ex cathedra* style running through his statements which indicates that the ideas were inspired at that office.

It presents a somewhat singular spectacle to see the officers of the War Department furnishing material for an attack upon the integrity and capacity of the General of the army. The student of history will, however, be thankful for the documents published by the reviewer, and will not be likely to cavil at the cause which has led to their publication.

## CHAPTER II.

### FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

The credit which the Review first gives, then denies, Grant.

In the opening paragraph of the chapter relating to the above named forts, General Sherman is presented to the reader as an officer deserving severe condemnation for ingratitude and injustice to General Grant. The specific charge on which this is based is "a deliberate attempt to take from General Grant the credit which belongs to him" for his movements on these two forts, and to assign it to General Halleck.

A careful examination of the Memoirs will show that Sherman gives Halleck the credit of *planning* the move which resulted in the capture of these forts, and to General Grant and Commodore Foote and their respective forces he attributes the praise for *taking* them. A like examination of the Review (pp. 10-13) shows that in effect, its author claims for General Grant all the credit for both *planning* and *executing* the move. The records produced only prove, at most, that Halleck had contemplated this move long before Grant ever suggested it to him, but that he (Grant), by Halleck's permission, attempted it and succeeded sooner and with less troops than the latter thought it could be done. The extract from the Memoirs (Review, p. 11), states that Halleck, at least a month before Grant's move, was seated in a room with a map before him, with two of his subordinates, Cullom and Sherman, near him, and that he asked for the views of these two as to the proper place to attack the rebel lines. One of them suggested "the center," which a pencil line, then made by Halleck, showed would coincide nearly with the course of the Tennessee river. Halleck then said: "That's the true line of operations."

It can not be seen from the above how long this very



plan may have been in Halleck's mind. It only shows that it was also in the mind of Cullom or Sherman, or both, before it was executed by any body, and that possibly this advice strengthened Halleck's own favorable opinion of it. Indeed, it appears from the following quotations that he had long been thinking about this move.

The reviewer quotes extracts from a letter dated January 20th (p. 12), from Halleck to McClellan, which, the reviewer says, "are sufficient to settle the question at issue." So they are. The following are sentences referring to the plan of operations:

"The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam, is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not the proper line of operations, at least now. *A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee,*<sup>1</sup> making Nashville the present objective point. . . . This line of the Cumberland and Tennessee is the great central line of the western theater of war, with the Ohio, below the mouth of Green river, as the base, and the two great navigable rivers extending far into the theater of operations."

"These suggestions are hastily written out, *but they are the result of much anxious inquiry and mature deliberation.* I am confident that the plan, if properly carried out, will produce important results."

No attempt is made to show that, up to this time, Grant had in any way suggested or proposed this plan to Halleck, or offered to take either fort. But on the 28th of January, one week after the above letter was written, Grant proposed to General Halleck to take Fort Henry, obtained his consent, and took it on the 6th of February, and Fort Donelson on the 16th.

This is the substance of the evidence by which it is sought to prove that Grant planned as well as executed the move against these forts, and on which are based the grave charges against General Sherman, found in the opening paragraph!

But on p. 13, the reviewer, with a sudden change of base, says that "if General Sherman had searched the records with the least care he would have found" that General Buell had suggested to Halleck long before this,

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<sup>1</sup> The italics in this and other extracts are mine.—M.

just about the same move that Grant afterward carried out. Evidence to prove this is furnished (pp. 13-18). Then it was *neither Grant* nor Halleck who originated the idea after all! But as the reviewer himself takes pains to show us (Review, p. 3) that Sherman only proposes to give "his recollection of events, corrected by a reference to his own memoranda," it is plainly wrong to censure Sherman for not giving the credit to Buell or to Grant instead of to Halleck, as neither his recollection nor his memoranda could furnish him any knowledge of Buell's correspondence with Halleck.

## CHAPTER III.

### SHILOH.

Our army not surprised. Generous treatment of Buell's army.

In Chapter III., the reviewer discusses the battle of Shiloh<sup>1</sup> and the alleged unfair treatment of Buell and his army.

In treating of the observations in the Memoirs about this battle, the reviewer undertakes to show, *First*, that the Union forces were surprised, and that Sherman was responsible for this; *Second*, that the positions of the various divisions with reference to each other was bad, for which also Sherman was responsible; *Third*, that Sherman wronged Buell and his troops by not mentioning them more fully and favorably in his Memoirs.

It is not my purpose, nor is it necessary, to go extensively into the history of this battle, for the purpose of contradicting the foolish stories about our forces being surprised by the enemy, at its beginning. No matter what were the reasons for starting them originally in the newspapers and elsewhere, there is not the slightest excuse for reiterating them at this time. Almost every one of the many extracts from the records found in the Review (pp. 26-35), contradicts these stories. The substance of these extracts may be fairly gathered from the following quotations:

"All my<sup>2</sup> troops were in line of battle, ready. . . . I gave necessary orders to the battery (Waterhouse's) attached to Hildebrand's brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their fire till the rebels had crossed the ravine at Owl Creek and had begun the ascent. Also sent staff officers to notify Generals McClernand and Prentiss of the coming blow. Indeed, McClernand had already sent three regiments to the support of my left flank. They were in position when the onset came."

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<sup>1</sup> The reader is referred to Van Horne's History of the Army of the Cumberland for a fair and full history of this battle. R. Clarke & Co., Cincinnati.

<sup>2</sup> From Sherman's official report of Battle of Shiloh. Review, p. 28.

<sup>1</sup>“Between 6 and 7 o'clock on Sunday morning, I was informed that our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the brigade on the color line, which was promptly done.”

<sup>2</sup>“On the morning of the 6th, our regiment met the enemy about two hundred yards in front of our color line.”

<sup>3</sup>“On Sunday morning, April 6, about half-past 7, I received a message from Brigadier-General Sherman that he was attacked in force heavily upon his left. I immediately ordered Colonel J. C. Veach, commanding the Second Brigade, to proceed to the left of General Sherman. This brigade, consisting of Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Forty-sixth Illinois, was in march in *ten minutes*, arrived on General Sherman's line rapidly, and went into action.”

<sup>4</sup>“About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, heavy and rapid firing of artillery was heard, and in a few minutes we received orders to form in line of battle in front of our camp. This order was obeyed with a coolness and promptness highly creditable to the officers and men.”

It is shown, on p. 34 and p. 35, that the heavy fighting did not begin until about 8 o'clock; but previous to this, Buckland's brigade had advanced about forty rods from their color line and opened fire on the rebels, instead of being surprised by them. (P. 33.)

The documents cited by the reviewer, together with other reports<sup>5</sup> of officers at the front, show that these officers were in a constant state of watchfulness; that the pickets were not less than two and a half miles out, and were strengthened as occasion required; that reconnoissance in force were made from time to time, and that both these and the pickets reported the presence of cavalry and infantry to the division commanders, who were on the *qui vive* in consequence, and that their troops were in line of battle on the morning of the attack.

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<sup>1</sup> From Colonel Buckland's official report to General Sherman. Review, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> From Lieutenant-Colonel Parlin's report, Forty-eighth Ohio. Review, p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> General Hurlburt's official report of Battle of Shiloh.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel B. H. Bristow's report of Battle of Shiloh.

<sup>5</sup> Senate Doc. No. 66, 2d Session, 37th Congress.

Since the reviewer himself has completely refuted these absurdities about a surprise,<sup>1</sup> it would be idle to pay any attention to his efforts to show that Sherman, a subordinate commander, was responsible for it.

As to whether the Union officers knew the plans and purposes of the enemy, or even the numbers and disposition of their forces as early as the reviewer intimates they should have known, is a very different matter. If these officers, under the circumstances, were in doubt as to the intentions of the rebel leaders, but were ready for any emergency, they are not liable to censure. We now know from rebel sources<sup>2</sup> that they did not fully determine until the second of April (their forces were then scattered from Corinth to Iuka) to make the attack; that the main body of their troops did not reach the vicinity of Shiloh, and that they did not definitely fix the date of the attack until *late in the evening of the fifth*. The battle began early on the sixth. It is readily seen from the above that to accuse our officers of blindness, criminal carelessness or incapacity for not knowing the plans of the enemy previous to the eve of battle, implies that it was their duty to know the date of

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<sup>1</sup> As to the rebels' view of this surprise, this sentence from Pollard's "Lost Cause," on p. 239, where he describes their advance to the attack, is significant: "But the enemy scarcely gave time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on the Confederate pickets." On the same page, he shows that they had no inconsiderable amount of fighting to do with our advance parties and pickets, before they came to Sherman's main line.

There is not as much evidence to support the assertions that our army was surprised in this battle, as there was for the assertion that Wellington was surprised at Brussels into the battle of Waterloo. It could be shown that he was at an entertainment at the Duchess of Richmond's on the evening of the 15th of June, and that an attack was made upon his forces at Quatre Bras on that day; that the troops so attacked, retreated during the two succeeding days, and that the battle of the 18th was fought twelve miles from the first point of attack, the duke having retreated that distance before he fought the decisive action; and that, up to the very day of the fight at Quatre Bras, he did not know precisely the point at which the attack would be made. Popular writers of that day made a liberal use of these ideas at the time.

<sup>2</sup> "Lost Cause," pp. 238, 239.

attack before the rebels had decided upon the time of making it, or their troops were on the ground!

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With reference to the charge concerning the positions of the various divisions, it is only necessary to state that Sherman was a subordinate officer, in command of one division only, and the reviewer does not even attempt to prove "by the record" that he was responsible for these positions, if wrong, or that he could be so considered.

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In reviewing what the Memoirs say about Buell and his army, the reviewer labors to make Sherman appear guilty of ingratitude for a personal favor rendered by Buell, as well as grossly unjust to him and his troops. Among other things, he says:

"All would suppose that when the author of the Memoirs sat down to write his version of Shiloh, he would at least have done bare justice to Buell and his army; but the reader will look for it in vain."

Both in the narrative part, lately written, of the Memoirs, and in his official report of the battle of Shiloh, which is inserted in full in vol. 1, p. 235, Sherman speaks repeatedly of this army, and of its officers by name, in even higher terms than the reviewer himself. A few of these passages are here quoted:

"Here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldiery movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back."

"The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near Hamburg road, both pouring grape and cannister upon any column of troops that advanced toward the green point of water-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed and entered this dreaded woods."

"Rousseau's brigade moved, in splendid order, steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it."

"McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, . . . where Beauregard commanded in person."

Sherman nowhere speaks in as high terms as these of *his own* troops engaged in this battle!

To compare with this, we will state what General Grant has said about the same troops on this occasion, together with the reviewer's comments on it (Review, p. 42):

"Concerning the actors in this battle, General Grant says:

"Of the part taken by each separate command, I can not take special notice in this report, but will do so more fully<sup>1</sup> when the reports of the division commanders are handed in. General Buell coming on the field with a distinct army long under his command, and which did such efficient service, commanded by himself in person on the field, will be much better able to notice those of his command who particularly distinguished themselves, than I possibly can."

"In this report General Grant says nothing of himself, and all of good that he could about others."

If this is all the good he could say about Buell and his troops, he certainly has said far less than General Sherman did. But let us see what comment the reviewer makes about Sherman's words of praise (Review, p. 39); which words, however, knowing, as he must, that they would condemn him, he does not give, nor does he in any way lead his readers to suspect their import: "But," he says, "it has never heretofore answered General Sherman's purpose to state the facts about Buell's army at Shiloh."

Such downright unfairness as this can only be the offspring of malice joined to a vindictive spirit, which men of small understanding can easily develop by careful training and long practice.

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<sup>1</sup> No other report was afterward made by Grant.

## CHAPTER IV.

### IUKA AND CORINTH.

#### General Rosecrans defended.

In this chapter, the reviewer invites attention to the battle at Iuka, and attempts to fix upon the Memoirs a misrepresentation of General Rosecrans. It has always been understood that Grant was disappointed with the conduct of Rosecrans upon that occasion, and the Memoirs give substantially the same account of this affair as the best informed writers<sup>1</sup> have given, varying as personal recollections usually vary from accounts made up from reports, documents, etc., but there is no expression in the Memoirs of disrespect toward General Rosecrans. They do say that Grant was offended with him, and the facts sustain the statement. There had been delay, caused, according to General Grant's official report, "by the blundering of a guide." It seems that the delay in attacking Price, in concert with General Ord, deranged Grant's plans. This offended or disappointed him. The blundering of the guide misled Rosecrans, and caused the delay. The Memoir says "Grant was offended;" but, "that in his (Sherman's) experience, these concerted movements generally fail, unless with the best of troops, and then in a country on whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in northern Mississippi." It is plain that General Grant in his report is excusing Rosecrans for the delay, while commending him for what he accomplished. The most reliable accounts which we have of the matter, are that Rosecrans dispatched to Grant, early in the evening of the 18th September, that he was about to

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<sup>1</sup> An intelligent writer, speaking of Grant's plans about these two battles, says: "He knew from his scouts that Van Dorn's army could not reach Corinth for four days. This would give him time to punish Price's temerity at Iuka, and then return to receive Van Dorn with a warm welcome at Corinth. But every hour was of incalculable importance."—*Grant and his Campaigns*, p. 122.



move for Iuka, and would close in upon the enemy that night, pursuant to previous orders. General Ord was to advance from Burnsville, while Rosecrans was to move northward, in two columns, from Rienzi, and attack from that direction. Instead of moving at once, he was delayed until midnight, at which time he dispatched to Grant that he could not reach Iuka before *one or two o'clock the next day*. *This was the disappointment*, because Grant feared that Van Dorn would join Price, and his desire was to have Ord and Rosecrans join in the attack upon Price *before* this junction.<sup>1</sup> The reader can readily understand the statements of the Memoirs, and that Grant's report excusing Rosecrans in no way tends to contradict the statement that he was offended and disappointed. In his zeal to contradict the Memoir, the reviewer apparently fails to comprehend the application of the language in the records.

So far as the statements relate the retreat from Corinth, the facts are these. After the retreat of the rebels began, on the 5th (October), Rosecrans started in pursuit, but by some error, he took a road north of the one which the rebels took, and they thus obtained a few hours the start of him. This advantage made it appear to General Grant useless to keep up the pursuit, and so he ordered it discontinued against Rosecrans's protest. I do not wish to express any opinion as to whether Grant or Rosecrans was right in this matter, but the simple fact that Grant ordered the pursuit abandoned, and Rosecrans protested against abandoning it, is enough to authorize the statement in the Memoirs that Grant was displeased. This inference is evident from the correspondence published by the reviewer. Instead, therefore, of his records tending to contradict Sherman, they confirm his statements.

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<sup>1</sup>The following is Badeau's account. Military History of General Grant, p. 112, *et seq.*: "On the 18th of September, Ord was pushed forward to within four miles of Iuka, where he found the enemy in force, on the north side of the town; and the same day, Rosecrans reported to Grant his readiness 'to move up as close as we can to-night. . . . Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on

the Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to move in ten minutes for Jacinto.' Grant ordered him to advance rapidly, and 'let us do to-morrow all we can; it may be necessary to fall back the day following.' The falling back was in the event of Van Dorn's attack on Corinth. This dispatch was dated fifteen minutes before 7 P. M.; but, after midnight, Rosecrans sent word that he had been detained, and was still twenty miles from Iuka, and could not 'be in' before 1 or 2 o'clock the next afternoon, the roads being in bad condition and the country thickly wooded. This greatly disappointed Grant, who had expected to fight on the morrow, early, and had supposed Rosecrans to be by this time far on his way to Iuka. He consequently directed Ord, who was quite ready to bring on an engagement in an hour's time, not to attack from the north until Rosecrans arrived, or until he should hear firing in the south. Rosecrans was notified, by his return-messenger, of this change in Ord's instructions; but owing to the density of the forests and the difficulty of crossing the small streams and bottoms, all communication between Grant and Rosecrans was circuitous and delayed. . . .

"The wind had blown heavily to the south and east the day before, and no sound of the firing had reached Ord; during the night, however, he had had word of the battle from negroes, and so pushed on toward the town, in the morning, in advance of Grant's order. Soon afterwards, Grant himself learned that the enemy were in full retreat; had in fact left Iuka during the night, on the Fulton road, which it had been expressly arranged that Rosecrans was to occupy with Hamilton's division. Getting up late, however, he had failed to do this, and the rebels discovering how nearly they were surrounded by the concentration of Grant's forces, held Rosecrans in check on one road and escaped by night on the other, taking with them everything except their wounded, and the artillery they had captured the day before. When Grant arrived at Iuka, at 9 o'clock A. M., the pursuit was not yet begun. He at once gave orders to follow, but the enemy had already got so far that it was found impossible now to overtake him.

"Grant had notified Rosecrans, in advance, of the movement of Hurlbut and Ord, and, anticipating the victory at Corinth, had directed that commander to push on instantly after his success, if necessary even to Bolivar; for, if Ord's little force encountered the whole rebel army, the danger would be great, unless Rosecrans followed up rapidly. But the troops were fatigued by two days' fight, and Rosecrans contented himself with riding over the field to announce in person his victory. At noon of the 4th he gave directions to rest that day, and move in pursuit on the morrow. When he reported his action to Grant, the latter, greatly disappointed at the delay, again issued peremptory orders to push on at once after the enemy.

"Rosecrans started out on the morning of the 5th, but was misinformed or misled, and took the road toward Chewalla, instead of that farther south, by which the enemy had moved. After marching about eight miles out of the way, he discovered his blunder, and turned his column toward the Hatchie.

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"Had Rosecrans promptly moved the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile. In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete; but the national forces arrived at the Hatchie, just as the rear-guard of the enemy had crossed. Rosecrans, from here, sent word again to Grant of the condition of affairs, and Grant decided that the favorable opportunity had been lost."

## CHAPTER V.

### CHICASAW BAYOU.

A chapter of the Review is devoted to criticisms of the first assault upon Vicksburg, a movement which the reviewer states was planned by General Grant, but was under the sole direction of General Sherman. The criticism seems directed against the execution of the movement rather than to the narrative which is given of it in the Memoirs.

We are not told that the plan was a bad one, or that Sherman failed to execute the part that was assigned to him. It is well known that General Grant proposed to co-operate with Sherman in this attack, but was prevented from doing so by the obstacles thrown in his way, and notably among them was the surrender of Holly Springs, on the 20th of December.

No one, that I am aware of, has ever shown that the failure on the part of Grant to co-operate with Sherman was a reflection upon his capacity. His part in the expedition consisted in engaging Pemberton in such a manner as to prevent reinforcements from being thrown into Vicksburg. This was not done, and Sherman found himself confronted by a larger force, upon his arrival at Vicksburg, than had been anticipated. In view of these facts, he withdrew after making sufficient attempts to convince himself that the city could not be taken by the forces under his command. If the events which prevented Grant's co-operation could have been foreseen, it is not probable that the expedition would have been ordered. The attempt to criticise Sherman because the roads were bad, and because the position was impregnable—if it amounts to anything—is a reflection upon General Grant, who appears to have planned and ordered it. Sherman's part of it was executed in accordance with his orders, and it is nowhere made to

appear that General Grant was not satisfied with the manner in which he executed the movement. The failure of the expedition was caused by unexpected and unforeseen events. Such failures are not uncommon in military operations.

In narrating these events in the Memoirs, Sherman expresses an opinion that results might have been more satisfactory, if Generals Morgan and DeCourey had been more prompt and energetic, and he says that General Blair was of a similar opinion. No attempt is made to show that this is not a just opinion, formed upon facts which support it. A slight attempt is made to show that this is different from the opinion expressed in his (Sherman's) official report of the affair. The reviewer fails in this attempt. An examination of the report shows that he speaks in a guarded manner of General Morgan's operations.

It is evident that, in the report, he is disposed to take all the responsibility for the failure upon himself, saying nothing, however, that is not strictly true, yet withholding a portion of his opinions for obvious reasons. But when, twelve years after these occurrences, he undertakes to write his opinions in full, he places the responsibility where he thought at the time it belonged.

This is the common-sense view of the matter, and when the report and narrative are compared, the alleged contradictions disappear.

The reviewer states that immediately after this action General Morgan was assigned to the command of a corps under General McClelland, who succeeded Sherman in command of the army. He does not, it is true, state in terms that these assignments grew out of this expedition; but the manner in which the statement is made is evidently intended to leave that impression. The reviewer must have known that these assignments were made without reference to the failure at Vicksburg. The attempt to make it appear that Sherman was relieved and Morgan promoted by reason of the management of the Vicksburg expedition, is an attempt at deception.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CHATTANOOGA.

#### Unsustained insinuations.

“In a previous chapter, it has been seen how coldly, unjustly, and almost contemptuously General Sherman’s book treats of Buell and his army at Shiloh.” With these words, the reviewer begins a chapter, in which he charges Sherman with treating Rosecrans and Thomas, and the forces they commanded, in substantially the same way ; and the measure of his fairness and success in the former case is a good index of the same in the latter.

The charge that Sherman failed to move with due haste to the aid of Rosecrans, while the latter was lying on the Chickamauga, in 1863, and thus became responsible, in part, at least, for his misfortunes, is not only false, but so stupidly false that their author must have seen this himself if he read the records which he prints. These records may be separated into three parts with reference to their intended use. From the first part (pp. 73–78), it appears that President Lincoln and General Halleck attempted to compel Burnside to move from Knoxville to the support of Rosecrans, then considered to be in great danger. These dispatches are probably furnished to show that great urgency was required, and promptness expected—from Burnside ; but what their application as to Sherman may be, we are left to conjecture.

The second part of these dispatches (pp. 79, 80), seem to be printed to *create the impression, by inference*, that Sherman was delaying<sup>1</sup> on the way from Vicksburg to Memphis, as they contain expressions from Halleck, in Washington, to Hurlbut, in Memphis, urging all possible promptness on Sherman’s part, and stating that nothing had been heard from him since a certain date. But Halleck’s dis-

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<sup>1</sup> This is nowhere charged directly.

patch<sup>1</sup> of September 18, to Rosecrans (p. 80, Review), explains all this. Steamers had to be sent from Memphis to Vicksburg, the camps on the Big Black had to be broken up, and troops and baggage transferred from there to these boats, which then had to ascend to Memphis, and "there being no telegraph line," no word had reached Washington yet.

The dispatches (pp. 80, 81), relating to the time after his leaving Memphis, can not, even by inference, be tortured into showing that Sherman was not making all possible haste consistent with his orders. The following extracts are essential parts of these very dispatches :

"He (Rosecrans) wishes them (Sherman's troops) sent by Tuscumbia, Decatur, and Athens. As this requires the opening of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad east of Corinth, an able commander, like Sherman or MePherson, should be selected." (Halleck to Grant, p. 80.)

"All available forces must be pushed on toward General Rosecrans as fast as possible. *Your attention must be directed particularly to the repairing of the railroad and the transportation of supplies toward Decatur.*" (Halleck to Hurlbut, pp. 80, 81.)

"As fast as troops arrive, they should be pushed forward, first to Corinth and then to Tuscumbia, repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad." . . . "The railroad must be kept up and guarded, in order to secure the supplies of your army." (Halleck to Hurlbut, p. 81.)

The fact that much of the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga was then, and for some time afterward, in such wretched condition, and so poorly supplied with rolling-stock, as to be barely capable of supplying the army already at the latter place, is so well known as to need no proof here; and this state of affairs was the cause of these orders.

The fact that Sherman was desirous of hastening to Rosecrans faster than his work permitted, is shown by his

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<sup>1</sup> WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 28, 1863.*

*Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga :*

Grant's forces (which included Sherman's command) were ordered to move by Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia to Decatur, and thence, as might be found necessary, to co-operate with you. . . . The order was received on the 18th, and steamers sent to Vicksburg to bring up the troops. They calculated to be able to communicate with you in fourteen days from that time. Since then, nothing has been heard from them, there being no telegraph line. The troops from here will probably reach you first.

dispatch from beyond Corinth (Review, p. 81), asking "whether I shall give preference to securing the railroad or reaching the neighborhood of Athens with expedition. The latter, I can surely accomplish; the former is problematical." To this dispatch (p. 81) Halleck replied, on the 14th, telling him to take care of his railroad. When Grant reached the front, he told Sherman to leave the railroad and come on. These facts fully explain the increased celerity of Sherman's movement after Grant assumed command at Chattanooga.

Great stress is laid on the fact that the 11th and 12th Corps reached Rosecrans sooner than Sherman did, as though this were to the latter's discredit. Common sense will show the reader, if it didn't the reviewer, that this was likely to happen, as they came *riding on railroads* almost the entire distance, whilst Sherman's troops were *marching and rebuilding* a railroad much of the distance.

Great stress also appears to be laid upon the fact, that General Sherman failed to collate the records of the War Department, for the purpose of showing the operations of General Rosecrans more completely in detail, with reference to the battles of Chattanooga and Chickamauga. It is quite probable that if all the records relating to these battles were published, much of the blame which was cast upon General Rosecrans would be removed, and it is to be hoped that this will be done. But it should be remembered that Sherman was describing his own operations, and was not attempting to write the memoirs of General Rosecrans, nor compiling general history.

The Memoirs, at p. 361, relate a conversation which occurred between Sherman and Grant, after the former's arrival at headquarters, in which the difficulties of the situation were discussed. It is stated by Sherman, that "Grant said that the mules and horses of Thomas' army were so starved that they could not haul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions were so scarce, that the men stole the few grains of corn that were given to favorite horses," etc. The reviewer quotes portions of this statement, and then asserts, *by inference again*, that Grant could not have made it—thus



charging Sherman with direct falsehood. To prove that Grant made no such statement, he produces his dispatches to Halleck, of October 26th and 28th, which, in substance, say that Thomas' plan for securing the river would provide the necessary supplies.

The dispatch of Grant to Halleck, on the very next page, dated November 21st, states that the condition of the Army of the Cumberland, then commanded by Thomas, was fixed and immovable; that the loss of animals was reported to exceed ten thousand, and that those left were hardly able to carry themselves.

The dispatches of October 26th and 28th do not contradict Sherman's statement, and the dispatch of November 21st certainly confirms it.

The degree of the reviewer's fairness can be seen also by the persistent manner in which he attacks Sherman for having charged that Thomas' troops could not be drawn from their trenches for a fight. After showing how bravely and well these troops did fight (which *no* one denies), the reviewer says (p. 88): "General Sherman must have thought all this rather lively work for troops that could not be induced to leave their trenches till they had been persuaded by the surprising spectacle of his men (Sherman's) making a breakfast of the enemy."

The reader should remember that Sherman *nowhere* makes the charge attributed to him, but says that *Grant told him* (Review, p. 71) "that the men of Thomas' army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive." That Grant did not say this is certainly not proved by producing an order issued a week before the statement was made, nor by showing that Thomas had no lack of confidence in his troops, nor yet by the fact that these troops did afterward leave their trenches and fight nobly and with success.

## CHAPTER VII.

### GENERAL THOMAS.

General Thomas neither belittled nor misrepresented.

The reviewer charges that the Memoirs not only misjudged Thomas, but that they intentionally misrepresent and belittle him. To sustain this assertion, he summons to his aid the record, which utterly fails to do so. Inasmuch as it was generally understood that the author of the Memoirs entertained a high opinion of Thomas as a soldier, and knowing that there was great personal friendship<sup>1</sup> between them, I read the statements in the review with considerable surprise, and especially the one charging Sherman with being "a calumniator of the dead." The assertions there made induced me to re-examine the Memoirs and ascertain particularly what their author has stated which was so derogatory to General Thomas.

After a tolerably close comparison of all these statements, they can be summed up, with one or two exceptions (to be noted hereafter), to be an assertion that he (Thomas) was a little slow in executing military movements.

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<sup>1</sup> Sherman himself, in the Memoirs, furnishes sufficient evidence of this friendship. In vol. 1, p. 177, he says: "My friend and classmate, George H. Thomas, was there (on the Potomac) in command of a brigade."

On p. 250: "General Thomas at once (after Shiloh) assumed command of the right wing, and, until we reached Corinth, I served immediately under his command. We were classmates, intimately acquainted; had served together before in the old army, and in Kentucky, and it made little difference to us who commanded the other, provided the good cause prevailed." When it is remembered that Sherman had formerly commanded Thomas, in Kentucky, and how averse military men usually are to serving under the immediate command of former subordinates, and that they frequently preferred to leave the army entirely, as General Palmer did, at Atlanta, rather than so serve, the full force of this will be comprehended.

Other extracts might be given, but these are sufficient.

Thomas is referred to in a great number of places<sup>1</sup> in the Memoirs in such terms as to leave no doubt that Sherman's opinion of him is that he was one of the finest soldiers in the army. That such is his opinion is also manifest from the fact that for years he has been the public eulogist of both Thomas and McPherson, as the general reader doubtless remembers.

The Memoirs are intended as a narrative of their author's experiences, incidentally alluding to the characteristics of the other officers with whom he held official and personal relations. It is evident in all that is said about Thomas, that the effort is made to explain to the reader a few of his personal traits, such as were known to his friends. It is because such traits are furnished in narratives, like the Memoirs, that they become valuable as an auxilliary to general history. Official acts of a prominent and successful military commander like Thomas are usually well known to the public; but the real student of history desires to compare the public acts of prominent men with the private traits of character.

Such a student desires the truth, and that only. It is of no consequence that Thomas was slow in moving his army; he was successful as a commander—more so perhaps than if he had been more active. Slow or active, his fame is fixed and will endure while the history of the war shall last. Sherman should not be arraigned for saying that he was slow, unless the statement is untrue. It appears from the appended letters of the officers who knew him best and loved him most, that they were of the same opinion as that expressed in the Memoirs. These officers were in a position to have personal knowledge of his character. Their reputation is such as to forbid us to presume that they would misstate the facts. The evidence, therefore,

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<sup>1</sup> In Review (p. 178), its author says: "Perhaps the most glaring instance of injustice to General Thomas found in the book appears on p. 209." He then quotes from one of Sherman's letters to Grant, the language alleged to be so unjust, and in the very extract quoted this sentence appears: "I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action, but *he is judicious and brave, and the troops feel great confidence in him.*"

upon this point sustains the Memoirs, and fails to support the reviewer's charges against Sherman.

In the chapters entitled "Affairs at Nashville" (chap. XIII) and "Thomas' Troubles at Nashville," (chap. XIV), the reviewer's main points seem to be—1. That when Sherman started on his march to the sea, he left Thomas behind "to grapple with Hood at every disadvantage" (id. p. 176), with forces plainly insufficient for the task, etc.; 2. That by dispatching to Grant that these forces were sufficient, he did Thomas an injustice, and by so doing became largely responsible for the troubles which Thomas suffered from Grant and others at Washington (id. p. 175); and, 3. That Sherman unjustly complained of the slowness of Thomas in attacking Hood.

To the last of these, it may be replied that, justly or not, with the evidence then before them each, the President,<sup>1</sup> the Secretary of War, the Commander-in-Chief, the country at large, and at least a large part of Thomas's own officers, were dissatisfied with or alarmed by his delay, and this feeling was not dispelled till Thomas so splendidly succeeded in defeating and destroying Hood at Nashville.

As to the second point, the reviewer himself gives the most abundant evidence that Thomas was reporting directly to Grant and the authorities at Washington, and that therefore they knew at first hand, and not through Sherman, just what his forces were, and did not rely on Sherman's judgment as to their sufficiency.

As to the first charge, it is only necessary to say that the events culminating in Hood's destruction showed that the forces were sufficient to accomplish that object, in the hands of an able general; and Thomas had been left to do the work because he was considered an able general. That he himself considered he had forces enough to do the work assigned him, is fully shown by his dispatch of (November 12), from Nashville, to Sherman at Kingston, where the latter had been waiting to further aid Thomas, if necessary, before starting for Savannah, and destroying the

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<sup>1</sup> See dispatches published in Review, especially pp. 184-193.

railroad communication between them. This dispatch is referred to in the Review (p. 179), and is found in Memoirs (vol. 2 p. 169). The following is the part pertinent to this matter:

MAJ-GEN. SHERMAN:—Your dispatch of 12 o'clock last night is received. I have no fears that Beauregard (Hood, in fact), can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you, I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, *and believe I shall have men enough to ruin him, unless he get out of the way very rapidly.*"

GEO. H. THOMAS.

Sherman, on the receipt of this, cut his communications, and started on his march to the sea.

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The letters hereto appended explain themselves.

GRANT TO HALLECK.

November 21, 1863.

"I ordered an attack here two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move artillery. Now Thomas' chief of artillery says he has to borrow teams from Sherman to move a part of his artillery to where it is to be used. Sherman has used almost superhuman efforts to get up even at this time, and his force is really the only one I can now move. Thomas can take about one gun to each battery, and can go as far with his infantry as his men can carry rations to keep them and bring them back. *I have never felt such restlessness before, as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumberland.* The quartermaster-general states that the loss of animals here will exceed ten thousand. Those left, are scarcely able to carry themselves."

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

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GRANT TO SHERMAN.

CITY POINT, March 16, 1865.

. . . Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have been attempting to get something done in the west, both to co-operate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness there—to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby. .

U. S. GRANT,  
Lieutenant-General.

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[The following is part of a letter written by General Grant to General Sherman, January 21, 1865. The remainder of this letter is found in the second volume of Memoirs, p. 257:]

January 21, 1865.

. . . "I was induced to do this (i. e. to detach Schofield's corps from Thomas) because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness

that satisfied me he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from which he returned to Nashville to take the steamer to Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness, and honesty, but is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report, and a determination to give the enemy no rest, determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere."

U. S. GRANT.

ATHENS, OHIO, July 12, 1875.

Gen. W. T. Sherman :

DEAR SIR:—I have from time to time read the ingenious and rather bitter reviews of certain portions of your "Memoirs" by Gen. Boynton, in the *Cincinnati Gazette*. So much as relates to your published comments and historical statements of the campaign of Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, and more especially his last great campaign of 1864, I have read with great interest. Neither to Gen. Boynton nor any one else do I yield the palm for devotion to the memory and history of Gen. Thomas. I served under him, often under his observation, from October, 1862, until the end of the war, and until November, 1865. I commanded a brigade at Nashville, and served all through his campaigns of that year.

It may be, in some degree gratifying to you, if I assure you that jealous as I am of the fame of Thomas, gratified as I am for his unsought indorsement of my own character as a soldier, and confident as I am that his record is without a blemish or "spot or wrinkle or any such thing," yet nothing that you have written of him and his campaigns do I criticise as untrue, unjust, or even injudicious and ill-timed.

The misgivings you had in your tent away off from us pressed heavily upon us around our camp fires at Nashville. We who were in inferior positions of command, felt, or at least feared, that the long delays were likely to be fatal in the end; and often, between November 30 and December 15, as I rode along the familiar lines of our army and saw the solid works of Hood going up, I felt the moments of delay were golden, and perhaps fatal ones to us.

That my impatience and misgivings were without reasonable cause, now appears affirmatively; and yet it existed, and was reasonable at the time. Our apprehensions did not take the shape of doubts of the zeal or competency of Thomas, so much as a dread of some obstacles to our progress, of the existence and magnitude of which we did not know and comprehend.

I am general,

Your obedient servant,

C. H. GROSVENOR.

ST LOUIS, MO., July 13, 1875.

General C. H. Grosvenor, Athens, Ohio.

MY DEAR GENERAL: . . I thank you for your frank, honest, and manly letter of July 12th, just received, and it may be of interest for you

to know that I have a similar assurance from many others, beside any quantity of official matter that sustain my "Memoirs." . . . To me it seems simply ridiculous that Boynton should arraign me for stripping General Thomas of his well earned fame, he who in life never had a kind word for General Thomas, whereas, I have been his intimate friend and eulogist for forty years (since 1836.)

In the "Memoirs" is recorded the fact that I united with General Robert Anderson, in applying in person to President Lincoln for his commission of Brigadier-General, and that we had to pledge our words for Thomas's fidelity, because he was a Virginian, that we began service together in Kentucky, and that in the Corinth movement, Thomas was commanding the right wing in which I had a division, reciting our intimate personal friendship and relations, and "that it made no difference to us which commanded the other, provided the good cause prevailed;" that when we came together again at Chattanooga, and in the Atlanta campaign, I relied on him mainly, consulting with him daily, and making no great movement without his assent, and when the crisis was at hand, I committed to him the absolute command of every soldier subject to my orders, except those with me on the "march," and thereby gave him the opportunity at Nashville, which completed his grand character and fame. I have from that day to this been his eulogist, and because I simply recorded, what was notorious, what is admitted by his *warmest* and *best* friends, that he was slow, deliberate, and almost passive in the face of exasperating danger, but true as steel when the worst came. Some men who before were silent, now become his defenders as *against* me. . . .

Excuse so long a letter, but I wanted to write this to some one, and am willing to confide it to you. With great respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

In a recent letter he also speaks of Thomas as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, }  
ST. LOUIS, November 18, 1875. }

GENTLEMEN:—I have the pleasure to receive your letter a day or two since, and yesterday got the book, "Van Horne's History of the Army of the Cumberland," which I have been engaged in reading during all my leisure hours since.

I take great pleasure in complimenting you on the handsome style in which this work is printed and bound. It would do credit to any publishing house in London. The subject-matter also is admirable, well arranged, and well digested; the narrative clear and concise, sustained by a reasonable number of official documents.

I notice your remark about the criticism on my own publication, and assure you that I object to no criticism whatever that tends to elicit the truth, and I will hail the publication of any work that treats of our civil war. I hope that the Armies of the Ohio, Tennessee, Gulf, etc., will all find as earnest advocates and historians as Swinton, for the Army of the Potomac, and Van Horne, for the Army of the Cumberland.

No one knows better than you the great variety of histories, sketches,

and memoirs which followed the battle of Waterloo. Even recently I have received one by Mr. Hooper, throwing new light on a battle fought sixty years ago. Our war covered a whole continent, and was a "civil" war, which of all others begets passions and prejudices of the most violent kind. It involved a dozen battles almost as important to us as Waterloo was to England, and assumed such a variety of phases that men may differ widely and yet be honest. I am assured by many who have read my Memoirs that they contain a high tribute to Gen. Thomas, for therein is recounted that we were school-fellows and associates in the army, and that it made little difference to us which commanded, provided the good cause prevailed. My Memoirs contain many allusions to him rather to illustrate his personal character, and the one wherein I attribute "slowness in attacking" was reported to me *officially* by the highest authority, after the event. The same of McPherson, whom we all loved and admired. In recording the event about Resaca, I could not help stating, *what he himself often did*, that he there had the best opportunity ever offered to achieve for himself a brilliant success. I am sorry his friends think I did this from sinister motives. No general can achieve fame without some mishaps, defeats, and mistakes. No general can be a man without the accidents of manhood. Washington himself, the brightest character known to history, made mistakes and sustained reverses. I think Gen. Thomas one of the grandest characters in our history; but even the sun may have spots without detracting from its perfect fitness as the center of the system of the worlds.

Truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, *General.*

TO MESSRS. ROBERT CLARKE & Co., Cincinnati, Ohio.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### GENERAL M'PHERSON.

No slur cast upon that officer.

This chapter (viii, Review) is devoted to describing the movements before Dalton and Resaca. The plan of the attack at this point is well known, and its general features have not hitherto been disputed by any one so far as I know. The Memoirs relate that General McPherson was directed to pass through Snake Creek Gap and get into Johnston's rear near Resaca, and, if possible, capture the latter place before Johnston could reinforce it. McPherson did pass through the gap, and some portion of his command reached the railroad, but finding a force stronger than he anticipated, he fell back to the gap and strengthened his position. The Memoirs say that in thus falling back McPherson "was a little timid." This is put forth by the reviewer as a slur by Sherman upon McPherson's courage. No intelligent man would think of attaching to this statement any slur upon McPherson. The entire narrative bears evidence to contradict any such intent. Further on, the Memoirs say that McPherson was justified by his orders in doing just what he did do. Nothing could be plainer than this language. It is true, that of necessity, in a move of this description, upon which so much depended, much was left to McPherson's judgment; feeling the responsibility, he doubtless felt inclined to take as little risk as possible, and rather than imperil the whole, he took the safer course, which, though admitted to be within his orders, is described as timid. No greater praise could be bestowed upon McPherson than is bestowed upon him, as will be seen if the entire narrative is read. A young officer, with a brilliant reputation, having the confidence of his army and his superiors, is intrusted with the command of a movement which, if fully carried out by taking Resaca,

would have added largely to his fame as a soldier. He was fully alive to the importance of the occasion, and was ambitious to accomplish all that was contemplated. When, however, he thought he had discovered a stronger force in his front than he had at first anticipated, he preferred to take the safer course of withdrawing to the gap and strengthening his position there. It is within the writer's knowledge that he afterward keenly regretted his movement at this juncture, and that he then realized that he had missed a great opportunity, just such as the Memoirs say it was. I recommend to the intelligent reader who feels an interest in McPherson's fame (and who does not?) that he examine the Memoirs, and compare them with the statements made by the reviewer. This examination will convince him, that while the measure of success might have been more complete, yet there was no failure to be attributed to any one, nor is there slur cast upon McPherson's courage or conduct.

The following letter from General Hickenlooper, then on General McPherson's staff, is evidence pertinent to this matter :

CINCINNATI, *December 11, 1875.*

*Col. C. W. Moulton :*

SIR: In response to your communication in reference to General McPherson's movement on Resaca, I have the honor to reply in detail according to my best recollection, from which you can extract and use such portions as you may deem advisable.

The Army of the Tennessee reached Villanow, May 8th, during the afternoon of which day I accompanied our advance cavalry through Snake Creek Gap to the table-land beyond, and, much to our surprise, found the gap entirely unguarded and unobstructed. We could only hear of two rebel cavalrymen passing through an hour or two before, and from all we could learn of their movements, they evidently possessed no knowledge of our advance.

On the following day, the army moved through the gap, our advance striking and defeating a brigade of cavalry at the *debouche* near Sugar Valley P. O., followed by the defeat of a light brigade of infantry; after which there was a considerable pause in the movement. I was sent forward by General McPherson to urge on the attack. I found General Sweeney, in command of the advance of the Sixteenth Corps, sitting upon a log by the roadside, taking matters very coolly. I informed him of the general's desire for an immediate advance, to which he paid but little attention. In a few minutes I again, more urgently, repeated the order,

and it not being responded to with the promptness I deemed necessary, I returned and reported the condition of affairs to General McPherson, who then came forward and personally directed the advance and deployment of troops to a point within about one mile of Resaca, where we occupied a low range of hills overlooking the valley of Camp creek.

The Sixteenth Corps was then thrown well to the left, and pushed forward in the direction of the railroad, and toward the enemy's position above, which movement soon developed the enemy in considerable force, the commanding officer of the corps reporting more rebels on his front than he had troops in his own command.

The river protecting Resaca from approach on the south, necessitated a direct attack from the west, in doing which the main road leading directly south from the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, only twelve to fifteen miles distant, would be completely uncovered, and the left flank and rear exposed to an attack from that direction should the enemy feel disposed to take advantage of the opportunity.

From all the indications then observable, I did not believe the enemy in front of General Dodge as numerous as represented, and, from the form of deployment of Confederate troops, felt that they, at that time, either underestimated our strength or anticipated only a strong cavalry raid.

It was now late in the afternoon—4 P. M. Much valuable time had been lost by General Sweeney's dilatory movements. Camp creek must be crossed, and a strongly fortified position beyond carried by assault, which rendered the capture of Resaca that afternoon a hopeless task.

I did, however, then, and still think, that by a strong and vigorous movement—accepting some risk—the Sixteenth Corps, with its left protected by the Fifteenth Corps, might have been pushed to the railroad above Resaca, and their line of communications temporarily obstructed, if not destroyed.

But General Dodge's reported concentration of rebel troops on his left, which, as I have already described, was much exposed, together with a scout's report of rebel troops moving on the Dalton road, no doubt induced General McPherson to order the withdrawal of our army to a strong defensible position at the *debouche* of Snake Creek Gap.

Respectfully,

A. HICKENLOOPER.

## CHAPTER IX.

### MERIDIAN.

General W. Sooy Smith's case.

In this chapter (Review, p. 89), the reviewer attacks the Memoirs for injustice to General W. Sooy Smith, and for statements concerning the movement. He begins with quoting a statement of General Sherman that the plan was to penetrate eastward into the interior of Mississippi and break up the railroads, etc.

The reviewer says that "much more than this was expected at the North, from preparations made and statements circulated;" and he goes on to state that "the general belief, was that the expedition was to penetrate as far east as Selma and turn upon Mobile." He produces no "records" to show who at the North it is that he refers to, or who it was that participated in the "general belief" of which he asserts so much, but proves nothing at all. It is not usual to plan military movements upon "expectations" of people far off at the North or elsewhere, nor is it common to consult "general belief" in arranging to execute such movements.

Further along, the reviewer becomes more definite and states that the impression was current (that the movement was more extensive than Sherman intimates) at General Grant's headquarters, at Washington. To prove this to be the fact, he produces an extract from a letter written by Grant to Halleck, in which Grant says, under date of January 15th:

"That he shall direct Sherman to move out to Meridian with his spare force—the cavalry going from Corinth, and destroy the railroads so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He will then return, unless the opportunity of going into Mobile with the force which he has appears perfectly plain."

It is to be observed that the insinuation by the reviewer is, that the movement designed by Grant was upon Selma or

Mobile; and this letter is produced to prove that such was his design in contradiction of Sherman's statement that the movement was a raid to destroy the railroads. Grant's dispatch to Thomas, of January 19 (Review, p. 89, 90), is in substance the same as the one to Halleck. Yet with this evidence before him, produced by himself, the reviewer asserts that Sherman states incorrectly the object of the movements. Grant's letter to Thomas states that the attempt to go to Mobile was to be undertaken only in the contingency that it was slightly guarded; and yet this reviewer says that the "general verdict of failure which met Sherman upon his return, called for prompt excuse, and the best at hand was found in the fact that the cavalry force from Memphis under General W. Sooy Smith had not reached Meridian as was intended."

It is difficult to keep within the terms of courteous discussion, when dealing with insinuations such as are made by the reviewer in this connection. He does not show by any evidence whatever that General Grant, the officer who he says planned the movement, considered the expedition a failure. He furnishes no clue by which we can tell who pronounced the general verdict of failure, which he says met Sherman upon his return, while all the evidence which he does produce, tends to prove that all was accomplished that was undertaken. In view of these circumstances, his assertion, that Sherman attempted to excuse himself from failure by casting blame upon General Smith, is inexcusable.

There is a charge in the Memoirs that General Smith failed to execute that portion of the movement intrusted to him, and the evidence apparently sustains the charge.

The Memoirs state that General Hurlbut's effective cavalry force amounted to seven thousand; that Smith had about twenty-five hundred in addition, which he had brought across from Middle Tennessee. This force, under General Smith, was to leave Memphis on the 1st of February, instead of which it was delayed eleven days. This delay, Sherman says, was unsatisfactory, in view of his instructions; he also says that his (Smith's) mode of returning to

Memphis was not what he had expected, from a bold cavalry raid. Sherman refers to his letter of instructions to Smith, as the evidence that the latter did not move as directed. The reviewer attempts to show, by circumstantial evidence, that Sherman agreed to the delay on account of the non-arrival of one of the brigades of his (Smith's) command. This evidence does not contradict the statement in the Memoirs, and it is not competent for that purpose, when there is better evidence at hand. The letter of instructions should settle this question, and the reviewer should have published it, together with all the papers bearing upon the question. The Memoirs state that the instructions were not obeyed. The reviewer says in effect, that this is not true. The way to settle the matter is to produce the instructions, which are on file in the War Department, and which the reviewer has evidently read, because he mentions them at p. 94. It is worse than idle to attempt to correct the Memoirs by records, and then omit to produce such records as must settle the controversy.

The only excuse given for this omission is that "they are voluminous." This is not the way to "explain the Memoirs in the light of the record."

The statement is also made that General Smith has sought to relieve himself of the censure which was at the time cast upon him by reason of his failure in this movement, which he does not appear to have accomplished. This chapter therefore may fairly be considered to be his (Smith's) side of the case, and the evidence does not satisfactorily sustain his view of it, because it is not as full as is desirable. The entire record ought to be published, and the responsibility for the delay would then rest where it belongs.

It is perhaps to be regretted that General Smith did not cause all the documents relating to this (for him) unfortunate matter to be made public long ago. Until that shall be done, readers are left to conjecture, and the failure to publish the instructions will not operate in his favor. Appended hereto is a letter addressed to General J. D. Web-

ster, which will serve to explain the views of General Sherman as to the best way to do justice to General Smith :

*General J. D. Webster, Chicago, Ill. :*

DEAR GENERAL:—General W. Sooy Smith feels aggrieved and wronged by my account of his part in the Meridian campaign in my *Memoirs*, Vol. I., pp. 389–394, and properly appeals to me for correction. I have offered to modify any words or form of expression that he may point out, but he asks me to completely change the whole that concerns him. This, of course, I will not do, as his part was material to the whole, and can not be omitted or materially altered without changing the remainder, for his failure to reach Meridian by February 10th was the reason for other movements distant from him.

I now offer him what seems to me fair and liberal, that we submit the points at issue to you as arbitrator. You are familiar with the ground, the coincident history, and most, if not all, the parties.

I propose to supply you with :

1. Copy of my orders placing all the cavalry under General Smith's orders (with returns).
2. My letter of instructions to him of January 27th.
3. My official report of the campaign, dated Vicksburg, March 7, 1864.
4. General W. Sooy Smith's report of his operations, dated Nashville, Tenn., March 4, 1864.

After reading these, I further propose that you address us questions which we will answer in writing, when you are to make us a concise written decision, which I will have published in close connection with the subject in controversy. If General Smith will show you my letter to him of this date, and also deliver this with his written assent, I will promptly furnish you the above documents, and also procure from the official files a return of the cavalry force available at and near Memphis on the date of my orders, viz, January 27, 1864. With great respect,

Your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *General.*

## CHAPTER X.

### RESACA.

The reviewer states in substance (p. 100):

1. That Sherman did not adopt the plan of pushing a force through Snake Creek Gap until seven days had elapsed after the attack was commenced.

2. That Thomas recommended this movement in February preceding.

3. That Sherman only adopted it after his failure by a front attack, and the delay of seven days enabled the enemy to retreat on his own lines, instead of being dispersed, with his communications interrupted.

The dispatches from Sherman to Grant (at p. 102 of the Review), of May 1st and 4th, contradict the seassertions. The first dispatch is from Chattanooga, in which he states: "McPherson moves to Villanow, Thomas to Tunnel Hill, Schofield to Catoosa Springs." The dispatch of the 4th confirms that of the 1st. When the reader examines the relative position of these three points, and understands the position of the rebels and their line of supplies, he comprehends the plan of the movements without the slightest difficulty, and the reviewer's attempt to show that the movement upon Resaca, by McPherson, was an afterthought, falls to the ground without a struggle.

That the general features of the campaign were agreed upon between Sherman and Thomas and the other officers in command in this campaign, has never been seriously disputed. It must be borne in mind, however, that the objective was not Resaca, Dalton, nor Atlanta, but Johnston's army. This being the case, the movements upon various places spoken of are to be understood as subordinate to the main purpose, which was to draw Johnston into favorable positions and fight him, wherever that could be accomplished.

The extract from Thomas' report shows that he sug-



gested that the Army of the Ohio and the Tennessee should demonstrate upon Dalton in front, while he, with the Army of the Cumberland, would pass through Snake Creek Gap and destroy Johnston's communications. He also relates that the Army of the Tennessee was sent through Snake Creek Gap to accomplish what he proposed to do with the Army of the Cumberland; but the Army of the Tennessee not reaching Snake Creek Gap before the enemy had informed himself of the movement, was unable to get upon his communications before the enemy had reinforced Resaca. From the foregoing, it appears that the plan of passing through Snake Creek Gap was discussed in February between Grant and Thomas, and that the same plan was suggested to Sherman by Thomas, upon the latter's succeeding Grant in command.

Thomas says that "Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for the two wings—the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee—to operate from."

From this language it is perfectly plain that what Sherman objected to was the suggestion that Thomas, instead of McPherson, should move through Snake Creek Gap, and that the movement through the gap was a part of the general plan agreed to by all and objected to by none.<sup>1</sup>

The impression conveyed by the concluding extract from Thomas' report (at p. 101), is that McPherson's army did not succeed in reaching the enemy's lines before the withdrawal of Johnston from Dalton to Resaca. Subsequent events show that the reinforcements of Resaca did not arrive until after the Army of the Tennessee had passed the

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<sup>1</sup> The plan was for McPherson to make the lodgment on the railroad at or near Resaca. The rest of the army encircling Dalton was, on the confusion sure to result (from this lodgment), to fall on all parts of Johnston's army after it had let go its intrenchments.

*This* being the plan, the propriety of retaining the main body of the army in front of Dalton becomes apparent.

gap, and had actually reached the railroad between Dalton and that place.

The attempt, by the reviewer, to show that Sherman contradicts himself, when he says he feigned on Johnston's front at Buzzard's Roost (i. e. Dalton) to attack *in force* through Snake Creek Gap, is not sustained by the records nor by the facts. The skill of the maneuvers, by which Johnston was forced to retreat from Dalton and Resaca across the Oustenaula river, consisted in Sherman's being able to threaten the destruction of his communications. To do this, his front must be so employed that he could not repel the flank movement upon his lines. This movement to Resaca was intended either to break up Johnston's line of supplies, or to seize and hold a position by which the entire force could be thrown upon his flank. Failing to destroy the line, McPherson seized and held the position by which the attack in force could be made through the gap. Had Resaca been taken by him, the rebel army would probably have been dispersed, and Thomas and Schofield were held in readiness to fall upon it in that condition. The Confederate Gen. Johnston's account of the movement shows how effectually he was misled by Sherman.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Johnston's narrative, p. 304 *et seq.*

## CHAPTER XI.

### KENESAW.

The reviewer's criticisms illustrated.

The observations relating to the assault made in this chapter would be scarcely worthy of attention, were it not for one or two points attempted to be made by the reviewer. When Sherman, at the head of a victorious army, with only a single line of railroad to transport his supplies, found himself confronted by the rebels in an intrenched position, he had to adopt one of three plans, if he wished to make any further progress. One was to abandon his line of railroad and attack by the flank; another to make the attack by regular approaches; while the third would be to assault the works. An assault was determined upon.

The reviewer says: "That, by the almost universal verdict along the lines, it was adjudged a needless move, and so an inexcusable slaughter."<sup>1</sup> The reviewer was, I believe, an officer with the Army of the Cumberland, and his opportunities to know the facts accurately are ample; hence his statement as to the verdict of that army ought to be true. This statement of his, he attempts to confirm by the dispatches from the commanding officers of that army. He also states, as if by authority, that General Schofield opposed the assault. If these statements are true (and I am not able to contradict them), they would serve to explain why the assault failed. An assault, undertaken by an army that had already decided that it was needless, would not be very likely to be successful.

The suggestion of the reviewer that these armies un-

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<sup>1</sup> One of the soldiers, who was at the extreme front in this assault, and who afterward measured the distance to the enemy's works from our lines, says that the first intimation that there had been an inexcusable slaughter was obtained from the Cincinnati *Gazette*, a few days after the occurrence.

dertook to express their opinions by a verdict of the necessity of any move directed by the commanding officer, is hardly worth a place in military criticism, and should be dismissed as a sensational paragraph written after the fact for newspaper circulation.

It reminds me of the anecdote of one of the new regiments, which found itself during the war stationed not a thousand miles from Cincinnati.

It had just succeeded in obtaining comfortable quarters, and officers and men felt like taking matters easy. About this time, an urgent order reached them to go to some other point on the line. This was not satisfactory, and a meeting was at once organized to discuss the question of going. I never learnt what the verdict was, but I presume the order was obeyed.

Judging from his statements, if the reviewer had been in chief command, in place of Sherman, he would not have made many powerful efforts to fight, but would have preferred to adopt the maxim that—

“He who fights not, but runs away,  
May live to fight another day.”

There is one observation made (at p. 116), which I think is probably correct. Sherman observes that “Thomas, as usual, shook his head,” when some proposition about a movement was made to him, and the reviewer says that Thomas could not have shaken his head through the medium of the cipher and the telegraphic wires. In this, I agree with him; and if General Sherman meant that such was his (Thomas’) usual manner of shaking his head, he is probably mistaken; nevertheless, it is possible that Sherman’s statement is true, and that Thomas did shake his head in some other way than by means of the wire and the cipher.

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Since the above was given to the printer, two able articles have appeared in the *Nation*, of November 25th and December 2d. Their author’s ideas on this topic are so *apropos* and well expressed, that they are inserted here :

"The chapter on the assault upon Kenesaw, which is called 'an inexcusable slaughter,' might be dismissed with the single remark that in war very few apologies are necessary for a bold attack upon a wooded position whose strength can not be known till you try it. Otherwise, Grant would be culpable for such attacks as that upon Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, where the element of boldness in his movement now rightly gives him the chief glory of it. State the case thus: Sherman, with about a hundred thousand men, found himself in front of a weaker enemy, holding a line of high wooded hills. His line of communications is a single railroad in his rear several hundred miles long, which is kept fully busy in supplying him from day to day in a country which affords nothing for the subsistence of his army. To turn the position involves the abandonment of his communications, and the taking of all the chances that his supplies would utterly fail, while the miry roads of the country were almost impassable. Shall he take the latter course without trying an attack on the position? We are sure every impartial military critic will say he must try the attack. Take another step. If he makes the attack with about eighty thousand men, and has a list of casualties of about two thousand five hundred killed and wounded as the result, is that by military rules to be regarded as 'an inexcusable slaughter?' The answer must certainly be, No. Once more, considering again the attacking force and their losses, was there or was there not good ground for Sherman's saying that 'one-fourth more vigor, mathematically,' would have 'put the head of George Thomas' whole army right through Johnston's deployed line,' when Thomas reported his columns as able to hold their ground 'within sixty yards of the enemy's entrenchments?' It surely can not be regarded as extravagant. Still again, when after such a proportion of casualties to the numbers attacking, General Thomas says (p. 114), 'One or two more such assaults would use up this army,' and can only suggest an approach of the enemy's field-works 'by regular saps,' does he exhibit such ideal energy that Sherman must be thought 'cruelly unjust' if he intimates that solid old Thomas was sometimes a trifle slow?"

## CHAPTER XII.

### POLITICAL GENERALS.

The successor to McPherson.

The reviewer seems to confess his inability to belittle the brilliant maneuvers which ended in the capture of Atlanta, but he finds an opportunity to arraign General Sherman for calling one or two prominent officers "political" generals, and yet there appears to be a doubt in his own mind whether or not the explanation given by Sherman of his meaning of this term does not import that it was preferable to that which he attached to the term "professional" soldier.<sup>1</sup> It is no disrespect to either of the officers named to assume that they did look upon personal glory won in the army as secondary to their political ambition. I think it may be justly said of most of our volunteer officers, that personal glory was a secondary consideration with them. I hope none of them will feel aggrieved if this is the judgment which history awards to them; it will remain as their best title to the regard in which posterity will ever hold them.

Sherman doubtless felt greater reliance upon regularly educated officers than he did upon those who were not thus trained to the service; whether he was right or wrong in this opinion, I do not wish to discuss; but in stating his own motives for his actions at this critical juncture, it is both right and proper for him to state them correctly; he was responsible if the movements failed, and it was his duty to act upon his own judgment. He now gives his reason for his action upon that occasion. Having given

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<sup>1</sup> I regarded both generals . . . as volunteers that looked to personal fame and glory as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambitions, and not as professional soldiers." *Memoirs*, Vol. II., p. 86.

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them there is no occasion for the statement that the term political as applied to these officers, implied anything like a sneer at their conduct, upon this or any other occasion. Elsewhere he speaks in high terms of praise of both of them.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

The plan as executed was Sherman's.

Did Sherman originate the march to the sea? The reviewer devotes thirty odd pages of his book in attempting to show that Sherman was not the author of this movement, incidentally attempting to show that Grant was the author of it.

To the ordinary reader, the reasons why this attempt is made are not apparent. It is beyond dispute that the movement was executed by Sherman in a manner satisfactory to General Grant and to the country.

Sherman says that he planned it, President Lincoln confirms the statement, and Grant has never disputed it. I shall not attempt to follow the reviewer's assertions in detail; but the statement of a few admitted facts will, I think, clear up the dispute.

The capture of Atlanta completed a series of maneuvers which were begun with Johnston's army as the "main objective;" that army now commanded by Hood was still in existence—weakened it is true, yet still capable of much mischief. As Atlanta was not the main objective of the campaign, it was no part of the plan to sit down there, as if the campaign had been closed by taking and holding it. But the question was what was to be the next move? A march to the sea, says the reviewer, had been contemplated by General Grant while he was in command at Nashville, and a mass of dispatches are produced tending to prove that he and other officers had such a move in their minds, and that many suggestions were made as to the manner of accomplishing it, all of which may be admitted to be true, and yet they do not contradict the statements of the Memoirs.

These dispatches indicate a plan of dividing the Con-



federacy, east and west, from the interior to the sea-board. The point most strongly indicated on the coast is Mobile, but any other point would have served as good a purpose; but each and all of these suggestions or plans contemplate interior lines, *to be occupied and guarded* from the starting point to the sea.

Without attempting to criticise these suggestions it is sufficient to observe that this was not the plan adopted and executed by Sherman in his march. The movements of his armies after the fall of Atlanta depended upon the course pursued by Hood. If that officer remained about Atlanta, ready to fall upon the moving column at its exposed points, then an attempt to shift position and establish a new base upon the coast would have been dangerous and difficult. Hood saw fit to move toward Nashville, evidently intending to fall upon Sherman's lines. As soon as this movement was known, the march to the sea became a definite plan, and was executed. Neither Sherman nor any other commander planned this movement, as executed, before Hood's movements became known.

The appended dispatches will, I think, serve to convince the reader that all the records published by the reviewer do not affect the claim, made in the Memoirs, that Sherman planned the march as carried out after the fall of Atlanta.

. . . "It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast *with a garrison left on the southern railroads leading east and west through Georgia* to effectually sever the east from the west. . . . *Grant's final report, July 22, 1865.*

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WASHINGTON, Dec. 26, 1864.

To General Sherman:

. . . When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I felt anxious and fearful. . . . Now the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, *for none of us went further than to acquiesce.* . . .

A. LINCOLN.

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SHERMAN TO HALLECK.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, August 13, 1864.

. . . If I should ever be cut off from my base, look out for me about St. Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia. . . .

W. T. SHERMAN.

SHERMAN TO HALLECK.

October 16, 1864.

. . I got the dispatch in cipher about providing me a place to come out on salt water, but the cipher is imperfect, and I can not make out whether Savannah or Mobile be preferred, but I also want to know if you are willing I should destroy Atlanta and the railroad. . .

W. T. SHERMAN.

SHERMAN TO HALLECK.

October 19, 1864.

. . I now consider myself authorized to execute *my plan* to destroy the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city [modified by General Grant from Dalton, etc.], strike out into the heart of Georgia, and make for Charleston, Savannah, or the mouth of the Appalachicola. . . .

W. T. SHERMAN.

SHERMAN TO GRANT.

October 22, 1864.

. . I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee, whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, break up its railroads, etc. . . .

. I think that far better than defending a long line of railroad. . .

W. T. SHERMAN.

CITY POINT, VA., Nov. 2, 1864.

*Major General Sherman:*

. . I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say then go on as you propose.

U. S. GRANT,  
Lieutenant-General.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### HARDEE'S ESCAPE.

The reviewer commences an account of Hardee's escape from Savannah, with a preamble evidently intended to show that Thomas was left behind with an insufficient force, with only one chance of success, which was to retreat, seemingly forgetting that Thomas had said, in substance, on the 12th of November (*ante*, p. 29), that he had troops enough to follow Beauregard (Hood) and ruin him, and that it was not until Sherman received this assurance that he cut loose and started for the sea (*Memoirs*, Vol. 2, p. 169). When these dates and circumstances are brought into view the attempt to show that Sherman left Thomas with an insufficient force (even that Thomas thought he was doing so), partakes of that class of misrepresentation which should be denounced as fraudulent. There can be no mistake about the views of General Thomas as to his knowledge of all the facts when he expressed his ability to follow Beauregard (Hood). The *Memoirs* say "that General Thomas was naturally anxious because he saw that on him would be likely to fall the real blow." Vol. 2, p. 169.

So it was the fact that General Thomas saw that he had all of Hood's army to contend with, and that the real blow was to fall on him, and he made no objection to Sherman's moving away from him, but expressed his opinion *that he was able to take the offensive*. Yet the reviewer says that he had only one chance to save himself, that chance was to "fall back slowly." That Thomas was wise in falling back to Nashville before giving battle, I neither affirm nor deny—but it is evident that he did not, on the 12th of November, consider that "falling back his only chance of success." That is evident from his dispatch to Sherman. The strategy of repeating is now put forth by the reviewer to adorn his paragraph for general circulation. As a mili-

tary criticism upon the movement, it has no authority except the reviewer, and he is not supported by Thomas himself.

The reviewer leaves this subject and takes up Hardee's escape from Savannah. The key-note of his comments is the dispatch from Mr. Stanton to General Grant, at p. 165, in which the Secretary says "that it was a sore disappointment that Hardee was able to get off with fifteen thousand men from Sherman's sixty thousand."

Sherman expressed himself as disappointed with the escape of the rebels, and it is possible that it might have been prevented. In estimating the responsibility of a military officer for permitting an enemy to escape, there are many considerations to be taken into the account. In the present instance, it is to be remembered that the ground occupied by our forces about Savannah was low and flat, nearly on a level with the sea, and that it was more or less submerged at the time. Further, that our officers were almost wholly unacquainted with the means of egress and ingress to and from the city. Under such circumstances, it is scarcely to be expected that every avenue of escape could be securely guarded; nor is it a matter of surprise that the commanding officer found that he was mistaken in supposing that he had made the investment complete; nor should it be overlooked that a small force under an active commander like Hardee could escape under such circumstances more easily than a larger one. Most readers will agree with the statement in the *Memoirs*, "that on the whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruits of victory." Future history will doubtless place a correct estimate upon Sherman's operations at Savannah, and he should be content with its verdict when the facts are stated. It is possible that if the reviewer had been in command he could have done better than Sherman did, but as he was not in command, the public will have to be satisfied with accepting his judgment of what "might have been done."

## CHAPTER XV.

### CAPTURED COTTON.

In commenting upon the captured cotton at Savannah, the reviewer endeavors to convict the Memoirs of misrepresentations relating to its transfer from the Quartermaster's Department to the Treasury Agents.

It has come to be tolerably well understood that almost anything can be proved that is desired in the cotton claims, which have been prosecuted against the government since the close of the war.

It is perhaps useless at this time to make an attempt to ascertain who it is that is responsible for the manner in which this branch of the public business has been managed. That the result of litigation which has grown out of these captures has been adverse to the government is notorious; that hundreds of thousands of dollars have been recovered by claimants by means of various pretenses, which ought not to have been allowed to prevail, is equally well known; that enormous frauds have been perpetrated upon the Treasury Department, in connection with claims for captured cotton, will not be seriously disputed. Officers of the army were generally of the opinion that the management of the business by treasury agents was such as to make these frauds possible, and that large sums of money would have been saved if there had been less haste in turning the cotton over to those agents.

Looking at the results which have been reached, it is difficult to say that they are not right. General Sherman, no doubt, preferred to have the Savannah cotton retained under the control of the officers of the Quartermaster's Department, whose integrity and capacity he had tested, rather than that it should be manipulated by civilians. He may have been wrong in this preference, but the results of the business do not justify especial boasting on the part of those who were intrusted with it.

The substance of the statement in the Memoirs is "that up to January 12, 1865, all the cotton had been carefully guarded with orders to send it to New York for adjudication in the nearest prize court, accompanied with invoices and all evidence of title; marks, numbers, and figures were carefully preserved on the bales, so that the court might know the history of each bale. Mr. Stanton changed all this, and ordered the obliteration of all marks." This proceeding General Sherman thought strange at the time.

The reviewer here volunteers a legal opinion, that cotton thus shipped would not fall within the jurisdiction of a prize court; but he fails to tell us why it would not, and it is puzzling to know why litigation relating to captured prizes of war would not fall within the jurisdiction of a prize court of the conqueror. The reviewer may know more about the law of cotton claims than General Sherman did; but, if he does, he does not exhibit it very clearly in this paragraph.

Yet his knowledge is apparently so extensive that he is entitled to the benefit of a presumption, that he does know that "cotton captured in war is not within the jurisdiction of a prize court." After the exhibition of so much legal learning by him, it is perhaps dangerous to pursue the discussion. Inasmuch, however, as he says nothing further on the subject of the jurisdiction of courts, but returns to his allegation of facts, we will venture to see what he states. He says that Sherman's charge, that the marks were obliterated from the bales, is not true.

To prove this, he introduces—

1. The order of the Secretary, directing the Quartermaster-General to assume charge of the cotton and transfer it to the Treasury agents.

2. The order of the Quartermaster-General regulating the manner of the transfer.

3. An agreement between the officers of the Quartermaster's Department and the Treasury Department, relating to the transfer.

There is not in either of these documents any order or stipulation that the marks and numbers should be preserved

on the bales. So far, then, there is not a particle of proof that Sherman's statement that these marks were being obliterated is untrue. It is, however, stated that Simeon Draper, one of the Treasury cotton agents, had instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury to preserve these marks. At p. 203, the reviewer gives what he says are the regulations to that effect.

The attention of the reader is invited to these regulations, when he will see that no provision is made for preserving the marks on the bales.

The regulations say that the marks and numbers must be carefully *recorded*; but not a word is said about preserving or retaining the marks *on the bales*—the very thing which Sherman says he had been careful to have preserved, and it was probably this *record* that was to be kept by the agents, and the absence of the bales, with the marks upon them, that has made it so easy to get a cotton claim through by those who understood this carefully made *record*. Be that as it may, the ignorance or malice of the reviewer, who boldly asserts that Sherman's statement is contradicted by these regulations and orders, surpasses any thing that he has before attempted. We must charitably conclude that he does not know the difference between preserving a *record* of the marks, and the preservation of the *marks themselves*.

It is gratifying to be informed, as we are (at p. 204), that the officers charged with these cotton transactions, employed a force of citizen clerks, who had long been in cotton business at Savannah, to preserve these *records* for future identification of this cotton. It would be curious to trace these *records* thus made into the court of claims, and ascertain how many of these "able and experienced clerks" furnished information from the memoranda thus obtained, which enabled the claimants to obtain judgments against the government. It seems from the Memoirs, that Sherman was informed that the total number of bales captured was thirty-one thousand, and upon this information, he says that the claims already allowed exceed the total number reported captured. From the statement in the Re-

view it appears that the total number of bales was thirty-nine thousand three hundred and fifty-eight, and that the total number allowed, and for which suits are pending, is thirty-six thousand five hundred and fifty-eight, leaving two thousand eight hundred yet unclaimed. It may be that Sherman was misinformed as to the quantity captured and shipped, and hence this error in his calculations. He was evidently attempting to illustrate the peculiar manner in which the cotton business was managed.

The discriminating reader will reach the conclusion that he has furnished the clue to the reason why judgments for so much of the rebel cotton have been recovered in the court of claims. The preserved *records* enabled claimants to complete the necessary evidence. Whereas, if the cotton had been shipped to New York, as Sherman directed, and the parties required to litigate their rights to it, in the usual mode of proceeding, before the bales were destroyed, and while all the facts were fresh in the memory of witnesses, and before there was time to manufacture evidence, it is probable that the government would have saved a large proportion of it. As it has been managed, it appears that the proceeds amounted to seven and a quarter millions of dollars, and that this has all been paid back, with the exception of a trifle over a half million—hardly enough to pay the costs of the litigation.

The fact that Sherman's order No. 10, January 12, 1864, directed General Easton, of the Quartermaster's Department, to turn over the cotton *in gross*, is commented upon in such a manner as to leave the impression that it contradicts the Memoirs. This is not the case. The explanation is this: When Sherman learned that General Easton was not to ship the cotton, but that, under the direction of the Secretary of War, it was to go to the Treasury agents, he knew that it thereby became unnecessary for General Easton to take it up on his property accounts, and account to the auditor of the Treasury Department in detail. Had General Easton shipped the cotton and sold it, it would have been his duty to have kept the account in detail, and rendered a return of it in the forms prescribed by the reg-



ulations. Inasmuch as he was not permitted to make this disposition of it, it became his duty to turn it over in gross—just as the order directs. To have attempted to have done otherwise would have interfered with the orders of the Secretary and of the Quartermaster-General already referred to, all of which is apparent upon the face of the orders themselves. (See Review, pp. 200–202.) Nothing but ignorance of the subject he was discussing, can excuse the reviewer for insinuating that a receipt in gross tends, in the slightest degree, to confuse the record, or destroy the marks on the bales.

This is on a par with this reviewer's assertion that a regulation which ordered a *record* of the marks on the bales preserved, was the same as preserving the marks and bales themselves. The facts presented in the records in this chapter are quite sufficient to show the totally unreliable character of what the reviewer has said.

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## CHAPTER XVI.

### BENTONVILLE.

The reviewer devotes several pages to criticising the disposition of General Sherman's army in its march northward, and he overflows, so to speak, with charges of carelessness as to the relative position of the various corps and divisions. It is true that he attempts to state the relative positions of the various columns, but whether these positions are the best that could be obtained or not, he omits to state. He does not pretend that the Memoirs misrepresent what occurred, and there is no attempt to contradict any of the statements made by Sherman which relate to this battle. He says that the columns were too far apart to be within easy supporting distance of each other. He does not show that the topography of the country or its roads were such as to admit of their being nearer together. He fails to show that the moving column which was attacked was unable to repulse the enemy brought against it. The facts are, that although an attack was made, it was unsuccessful. The reviewer attempts to explain that a portion of the army was at one time in great danger. The answer might be, that if this were so, it escaped with very small loss. The history of this affair, as well as the result of the operations, show that there was no such danger. Sherman's army at that time was *en route* for Richmond, and there was no disposition to be drawn aside by minor considerations. It is also probable that Sherman's army was not so afraid of danger as the reviewer evidently thinks they should have been under the circumstances.

In marching through a strange country, where the roads are unfamiliar to the army, it will frequently happen that the moving columns will become separated to a greater distance than is desirable, and it is possible that something of this kind happened to this army, not only upon this

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occasion, but upon several occasions; but the general results show that it marched a greater distance with less loss of men or equipments than any other army organized during the war. It is probable that no army of modern times, in any country, ever performed their work better, or with more promptness and exactness, than was displayed by Sherman's army in this extraordinary march from Chattanooga to Washington. It was admitted at the time that the work was well done, and the thanks of the nation were freely tendered to them. The attempt now to show that it amounted to but little, and was carelessly planned or executed, ought to be branded as unjust and untruthful by every officer and soldier who remembers it.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE REJECTED AGREEMENT.

When the reviewer reached that portion of the *Memoirs* in which the transactions with Johnson are narrated, he evidently felt the inspiration which has always manifested itself whenever this agreement has been discussed by newspaper correspondents. I do not agree with some of his critics, that he devoted too much space to this topic. It is an interesting subject—one which can be taken up after a lapse of ten years and studied with interest and profit. The reviewer says that Sherman has given an inaccurate history of the negotiations, whereupon he proceeds to expose the inaccuracies, producing several valuable historical documents for which he would be entitled to great credit if they supported his allegation. Inasmuch as the reviewer has devoted forty pages to reviewing the terms of the agreement, he ought not cavil at Sherman for devoting thirty pages of his narrative in relating a history of it.

These pages of his have been examined by me, and while I find much in them criticising the agreement and Sherman's conduct in reference to it, I fail to find that the reviewer has pointed out the inaccuracies which he charges at the commencement of his chapter. There may be some minor errors in the *Memoirs*—such errors frequently occur in narratives of all transactions—but the reviewer himself appears to have forgotten to point them out. He gives his own views of the agreement, and he furnishes many documents of value, but these documents sustain the statements in the *Memoirs* in almost every particular. Any one who reads them and compares them with the *Memoirs*, will be surprised that Sherman's recollection was so accurate as to all the leading facts.

The reviewer says that the "real character of the terms were carefully concealed." He adduces no proof of this, and there are no circumstances to support his assertion ;

but suppose it were true, was it not proper they should be concealed? In its nature it was a confidential document, which bound neither party, and was of no permanent validity until ratified by the civil authority. It was drawn up to be submitted—it was sent to the proper official for approval or rejection, and until such proper authority had acted upon it, it was the duty of the commanding officer not to divulge its terms.

In his narrative, Sherman says that he talked the subject of the surrender over with his leading officers, and all the general features of the agreement were discussed. Sherman was doubtless the proper judge as to how far its particular stipulations should be disclosed. The precise bearing of the reviewer's observation to the effect that Sherman's position would have been made very uncomfortable if it had been known that a member of the rebel Cabinet had written the first draft of it is not preceptible. I fail to understand why he lays so much stress upon the writing of the first draft. The agreement as executed was drawn up by Sherman, and the copy of Reagan, the rebel cabinet officer referred to, differs from it in a number of details. The evidence shows that Reagan's copy was rejected, and that Sherman made a draft which suited himself.

Sherman states all this in his narrative. The Confederate General Johnston, in his narrative, makes a similar statement, and adds that Sherman wrote so rapidly that he thought he must have come prepared to make the draft. Sherman and Johnston both agree that the terms of the agreement had been settled upon between them *before Reagan took part in the business*. Johnston says that Reagan only wrote down what had been agreed to, with the exception of the amnesty clause. The evidence is therefore conclusive that the paper which was executed was the work of Sherman, and that Reagan's draft was not used.

It is to be regretted that the records of the War Department have not been searched, with a view to ascertain if possible the cause of the uproar in the newspapers which followed the publication of this agreement. Not only was the agreement itself attacked by them, but

Sherman was made the subject of the most outrageous insults throughout the entire North. He was almost branded as a traitor. The excitement was nearly as high as it was when Fort Sumpter was fired upon.

There must have been some cause for this outside of the agreement itself, and we shall not probably ascertain what that cause was, *until all the war office records* are published. If that is ever done, the facts will, I presume, be disclosed, which will explain the matter.

There is nothing in the terms of the agreement to create such a storm of abuse as it seemed to produce. But even if there had been, there was no occasion for alarm; it bound no one, and made no pretense of doing so; there was nothing in the relative positions of Sherman and Stanton, that made it improper in the former to present it to the latter.

If the paper was as bad as the newspapers claimed it to be, the utmost that Sherman was chargeable with, was that he gave to the authorities at Washington an opportunity to make a disadvantageous agreement with the rebels. If they had availed themselves of the opportunity, and concluded such an agreement, Sherman might have been blamed for submitting it to them. Inasmuch, however, as the agreement was rejected, and the *statu quo* of the army was restored, without any loss, there was no occasion for excitement.

As above observed the causes for this excitement must be sought for elsewhere than in the agreement.

The reviewer furnishes us with a clue, I think, to the causes of the extraordinary course which was pursued toward General Sherman. He says:

"General Sherman was elated almost beyond measure at his march to the sea and northward through the Carolinas." \* \*

"General Grant had captured the great army of the Confederacy; all the rest must follow as a matter of course. Sherman was not in at the death, the war was to close with General Grant as its greatest military hero.

Then came the proposal for a conference with Johnston, while first writing to Johnston that he would extend the same terms given by Grant to Lee, and immediately writing General Grant that he would be careful

not to complicate any point of civil policy, yet doubtless influenced by his own reflections upon the secondary part in which events were leaving him, and by the cunning manipulations of the rebel cabinet, he conceived the idea not only of receiving the surrender of the remaining military forces of the rebellion, and of declaring peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, but of becoming the political reconstructor of the nation, and thus the most prominent character emerging from the war."—*Review*, pp. 220, 221.

Especial attention is invited to the foregoing extracts, because they are believed to represent the opinions of those in authority at Washington, who sought to destroy Sherman at the time the Johnston agreement was proposed. The substance of the statement is that Sherman desired to have the war closed by the surrender of all the rebel forces. The surrender of all the remaining forces of the rebellion was the substance of the agreement.<sup>1</sup> This was sent in the usual manner to the proper authority for consideration. Because Sherman received this proposal and recommended its adoption, he was denounced as a traitor. And now ten years after the event, the reasons why he was thus denounced, are dimly shadowed in the extract quoted above, the substance of which is that if the surrender of all the remaining rebel forces was received by him, he would be likely to be "the most prominent character emerging from the war." This amounts to an admission that the surrender must be refused, in order to prevent Sherman from becoming "the most prominent character emerging from the war."

This is not the place to discuss the terms of the agreement, but such motives for its rejection as are here intimated are absolutely wicked. It was of comparatively little consequence who became "the most prominent character emerging from the war," but it was of the utmost importance to end the war without further waste of life or property.

The cause of complaint by General Sherman at the

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<sup>1</sup> The forces to be surrendered consisted of Johnson's own army; that of Dick Taylor, in Louisiana and Texas; the armies under Generals Maury, Forest, and others in Alabama.

course the War Department pursued with reference to this agreement, was that it was published in the newspapers with the instructions given to General Grant, of March 3, which had not, at that time, been sent to him (Sherman), thereby creating the impression that he had violated instructions which he had never seen. The conduct of the Secretary of War in this instance was a departure from the usages of his department, and was a violation of that official courtesy due from one officer to another, and it was this conduct that caused Sherman to complain. He never has complained of its rejection; but, its publication, with Mr. Stanton's reasons and the sensational dispatches insinuating that he had been bribed to let Jeff. Davis escape, which emanated from the War Department, he considered an attempt to insult and destroy him.

So far as the public is concerned, they have a right to discuss the provisions of the agreement in a far different spirit; to them the question is, whether or not the plan proposed in it (with the proper modifications) would have proved more satisfactory and less expensive than the plan which has been adopted. I do not wish to discuss this question in this connection further than to observe that the agreement contemplated a return to the *ante-bellum* condition by the States forming the Confederacy, and that the terms of reconstruction should be agreed to by each of those States respectively with the United States. This plan would have been a simpler method than the one that has been pursued, and would probably have prevented much of the fraud incident to the destruction of State governments.

There is one reason given by Mr. Stanton for rejecting the agreement that is remarkable, and especial attention is invited to it. In the order in which the reasons are printed, it appears as the eighth. It is as follows:

"*Eighth.* It (the agreement) gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition." Review, p. 233.

The statements here made are extraordinary. The agreement provided in substance for the disbanding of the



Confederate armies, and that each officer and man should cease from acts of war and abide by the action of the Federal authorities, the re-establishment of Federal courts, the cessation of the war, a general amnesty, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits. In effect, the rebels were to disband, lay down their arms, return home, and obey the laws. The most prosperous condition of the rebels was early in 1863. If the statement made in Mr. Stanton's *eighth reason* be true, we continued the war for nearly two years after the rebels offered to disband their armies and cease all resistance to the laws, and to submit to the Federal authority.

The last two years of the war cost more than half of all the war debt, with a corresponding loss of life, and during that time it appears from this statement that the rebels repeatedly offered to submit to the laws and give up the contest, and that these terms were rejected.

It becomes important to know for what reason the war was continued two years after all resistance to the constitution and the laws was offered to be discontinued. The excitement was so great at the time this statement was made, that no notice was taken of it, but the time has now arrived when an inquiry can be properly and safely made, and it would not be amiss to have the subject investigated, with a view to have history correctly written. It was claimed at the beginning of the war, and during its existence, that the sole purpose for which it was prosecuted was to overcome the armed resistance to the laws and to maintain the integrity of the Union. No other purpose has ever been avowed by the government, or understood by the people. In view of this fact, this declaration by the Secretary of War becomes important and remarkable. It would be well if the reviewer would continue his researches among the records of the War Department, with a view of ascertaining the particulars of such offers made by the rebels. When the documents upon which this declaration is based are published, they may change public opinion as to the real objects of the war.

In view of this statement (i. e. the eighth reason) the

war office records may also throw new light upon the action of the Department in rejecting the agreement. Admiral Porter has related a conversation which took place between President Lincoln, Sherman, Grant, and himself, on board the flag-ship "Queen," at City Point, March 27, 1865.

This conversation is given at p. 328 *et seq.*, vol. 2 of the Memoirs, and it is an exceedingly interesting document taken in connection with the events which followed it, and especially with reference to the agreement. He there says that Sherman insisted that he could command his own terms from Johnston, but that the President insisted that the surrender of Johnston's army must be obtained upon any terms, and that Sherman yielded to the President's views.

It seems very strange that the President should have been so desirous of obtaining Johnston's surrender upon "any terms," if he had repeatedly and solemnly rejected better terms than a disbanding of the rebel army and a submission to the laws under Federal authority. Considerable stress, in this connection, has been laid upon the dispatch to Grant, of March 3, 1865, limiting his (Grant's) powers to matters purely military, and prohibiting the discussion of civil matters with the rebels. This was doubtless proper, and should have been communicated to Sherman, if it was expected to limit and guide his conduct; but it was not communicated to him until after the Johnston agreement was submitted to the Secretary of War.

On the contrary, he had the President's views as expressed to him on the 27th of March, as above stated, and he had observed that the commanding officer at Richmond had approved the call for convening the legislature of Virginia, and he had Secretary Stanton's direction, when at Savannah, to take charge of all matters, *civil and military*. These facts and circumstances, combined with the oft-repeated declarations that the war was prosecuted for the sole purpose of restoring Federal authority, were sufficient to lead him to think that an agreement which embodied a submission to the constitution and the

laws was at least worthy of being considered. Least of all did he suppose that he would be denounced as a traitor for transmitting it to the authorities at Washington !

Ten years have elapsed since the war closed, and we now know that all the terms offered to Johnston have been in substance agreed to, with the exception of the stipulation relating to a recognition of the rebel State governments.

Whether the course which has been adopted is better than it would have been to recognize those in existence at the close of the rebellion, is a question which time and future events will probably answer.

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The following is the Confederate general Johnston's account of the interviews :

"In the morning of the 16th (April), when the army was within a few miles of Greenboro, a reply to the letter of the 13th was received from General Sherman, signifying his assent to the proposal that we should meet for conference in relation to an armistice. Supposing that the President (Davis) was waiting in Greensboro to open negotiations, should the armistice be agreed upon, I hastened there to show General Sherman's reply, and to receive any instructions he might have to give. He had quitted the town, however, and was on the way to Charlotte.

"Having requested Lieutenant-General Hampton, by telegraph, to arrange the time and place of meeting, I went to his headquarters, two or three miles southeast of Hillsboro. There General Hampton informed me that the conference was to be at noon next day, at a house on the Raleigh road, midway between the pickets of the two armies.

"General Sherman met me at the time and place appointed, the house being that of a Mr. Bennett. As soon as we were without witnesses in the room assigned to us, General Sherman showed me a telegram from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of the President of the United States. . . .

"When General Sherman understood what seemed to have escaped him in reading my letter, that my object was to make such an armistice as would give opportunity for negotiation between the 'civil authorities' of the two countries, he said that such negotiations were impossible, because the government of the United States did not acknowledge the existence of a Southern Confederacy, nor, consequently, its civil authorities as such ; therefore, he could not receive, for transmission any proposition addressed to the government of the United States by those claiming to be the civil authorities of a Southern Confederacy. He added, in a manner that carried conviction of sincerity, expressions of a wish to divert from the South such devastation as the continuance of the war would make inevitable ;

and, as a means of accomplishing that object, so far as the armies we commanded were concerned, he offered me such terms as those given to General Lee.

"I replied that our relative positions were too different from those of the armies in Virginia to justify me in such a capitulation, but suggested that we might do more than he proposed: that, instead of a partial suspension of hostilities, we might, as other generals had done, arrange the terms of a permanent peace. . . . We then entered into a discussion of the terms that might be given to the Southern States on their submission to the authority of the United States. General Sherman seemed to regard the resolutions of Congress and the declaration of the President of the United States as conclusive, that the restoration of the Union was the object of the war, and to believe that the soldiers of the United States had been fighting for that object. A long official conversation with Mr. Lincoln, on Southern affairs, a very short time before, had convinced him that the President then adhered to that view.

*"In the course of the afternoon we agreed upon the terms expressed in the memorandum drawn up on the 18th, except that General Sherman did not consent to include Mr. Davis and the officers of his cabinet in an otherwise general amnesty. Much of the afternoon was consumed in endeavors to dispose of this part of the question in a manner that would be satisfactory both to the government of the United States and the Southern people, as well as to the Confederate President; but at sunset no conclusion had been reached, and the conference was suspended, to be resumed at ten o'clock next morning. Thinking it probable that the confidential relations of the Secretary of War with Mr. Davis might enable him to remove the only obstacle to an adjustment, I requested him by telegraph to join me as soon as possible.*

"General Breckinridge and Mr. Reagan came to General Hampton's quarters together, an hour or two before daybreak. After they had received from me as full an account of the discussion of the day before as my memory enabled me to give, *and had learned the terms agreed upon*, and the difficulty in the way of full agreement, Mr. Reagan proposed to reduce them to writing, to facilitate reconsideration. In doing so, he included the article for amnesty without exceptions, *the only one not fully agreed to*. This paper, being unfinished when General Breckinridge and myself set out to the place of meeting, was to be sent to me there.

"When we met, I proposed to General Sherman that General Breckinridge should be admitted to our discussions, as his personal relations with the President of the Confederacy might enable him to remove the obstacle to agreement that we had encountered the day before. He assented, and that gentleman joined us.

"We had conversed on the subject discussed the day before perhaps a half hour, when the memorandum written by Mr. Reagan was brought. I read this paper to General Sherman, as a basis for terms of peace, pointing out to him that it contained nothing which he had not already accepted, but the language that included the president and the cabinet in the terms of amnesty. After listening to General Breckinridge, who addressed him six

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or eight minutes in advocacy of these conditions of peace, General Sherman wrote very rapidly the memorandum that follows, with the papers presented by me before him. He wrote so rapidly that I thought, at the time, that he must have come to the place prepared to agree to amnesty, with no exceptions. His paper differed from mine only in being fuller." Johnston's Narrative, p. 401-405.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE LINE AND THE STAFF.

"General Sherman, in his last chapter, discusses at considerable length the same issues which he raised with the Secretary of War and the statute law, when he assumed the duties of general, assigning all the officials in the War Department, except the secretary himself, and possibly his chief clerk, to duty upon his staff." (Review, p. 259.)

The foregoing paragraph commences a chapter devoted to a discussion of the law and ethics of army administration in general, and the conduct of General Sherman in particular, at or about the time he was assigned to the command of the army. Further along, at page 270, he charges Sherman in substance with insubordination, because he stated that he agreed with a report made by the military committee of the House, relating to the control of the staff department officers, adding that he, Sherman, would carry out such views as far as he had power. And this, says the reviewer, "was in a formal report after he had been ordered by the President not to carry out these identical views." (Review, p. 271.)

In another paragraph, the reviewer charges General Sherman with "boldly invading the President's official household by attaching the chief of staff there, to report to him at the headquarters of the army." (Id. 267.)

Here are three distinct charges or specifications:

1. Violation of law.
2. Insubordination.
3. Official discourtesy toward the President.

To sustain these charges the reviewer produces—

1. General Order No. 11, March 8, 1869. (Review, 263.)
2. General Order No. 12, of the same date. (Id. 264.)
3. General Order No. 28, March 27, 1869. (Id. 265.)

These documents are followed by a number of citations

for the purpose of illustrating the laws governing the army, which will be noticed as we proceed.

As to Order No. 11,<sup>1</sup> it is a publication of the President's order of March 5th (three days preceding), and contains nothing else on its face. It states that it is issued "by direction of the President," and Sherman does not appear to have had anything to do with it—indeed, he could not have had anything officially to do with it, because it was issued by the President three days before Sherman assumed command of the army as general.

Paragraph 2 of that order directs—

"That the chiefs of staff corps, department, and bureaus will report to and act under the *immediate* orders of the general commanding the army."

The next paragraph provides that all official business which, by law or regulations, requires the action of the President or Secretary of War, will be submitted by the general of the army to the Secretary of War. (Review, pp. 263, 264.)

The reader's attention is invited to the fact that Sherman found this order in force when he assumed command

<sup>1</sup>[*General Order No. 11.*]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, }  
WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1869.* }

The following orders of the President of the United States are published for the information and government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, }  
WASHINGTON CITY, *March 5, 1869.* }

By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman will assume command of the Army of the United States.

The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the army. All official business, which by law or regulations requires the action of the President or the Secretary of War, will be submitted by the General of the Army to the Secretary of War; and, in general, all orders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of the army line or staff will be transmitted through the General of the Army.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

Secretary of War.

By command of the General of the Army.

E. D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

of the army on the 8th of March, it being dated three days prior to that event; and further, that by its terms, the chiefs of staff departments are ordered to report to him, and that among these officers is the "adjutant-general," the "chief staff officer of the President's official household," alluded to by the reviewer at page 267.

Attention is also invited to Sherman's order No. 12, pages 264, 265 (March 8), in which he assigns these staff officers to duty upon the general staff. From this examination it will appear that, in assigning these officers to duty, he was obeying the order of the President.

This examination will show also that if the laws were violated by the order, it was the President who violated them in the first instance, and not General Sherman. Thus, the charge against Sherman amounts to nothing from this evidence. Again, it also disposes of the charge "of boldly invading the President's official household," because the order on its face shows that the officer referred to (the adjutant-general) was directed by the President to report to General Sherman.

It will be seen that Order No. 12 is precise in its terms. It attempts to do nothing more than to execute the President's order, which Sherman was bound to obey. The intimation of official discourtesy toward the President therefore disappears with the charge of violating the statute law. There is, however, one view to be taken of this matter which should not be overlooked. At page 263, the reviewer says, in substance, that one of Sherman's first official acts was to issue an order reducing the Secretary of War to the position of a mere clerk, and that for this purpose, he obtained a preliminary order from the President. He then furnishes a copy of the Order No. 11 (above referred to). It might be deemed a complete answer to this assertion to call attention to its date, which, as already observed, is three days prior to Sherman's assuming command of the army; but I do not wish to answer the charge in this way, lest the impression might be thereby left that Sherman obtained the order before assuming command for some purpose of his own.



The reviewer pays a poor compliment to the President as well as to General Schofield (then Secretary of War), when he says that they allowed Sherman to obtain this order, stating, as he does, that the attention of the latter was directed to the fact that it violated "twenty-six sections of statute law or regulations," and that he (Schofield) contented himself with pointing out this fact, as he was about to retire from his position. One would suppose that General Schofield, in whose name this violation of law was committed, would have done something more than to point out the fact, "being contented" with so doing.

It would have been well if the reviewer had produced some better evidence of this statement relating to General Schofield's action in this connection, than his own assertion. No officer is bound to issue or obey an order which he knows violates the law; hence, if General Schofield issued this order under the direction of the President, knowing it to be a violation of the law, he was guilty of a grave offense. General Schofield's rank and reputation were such as to forbid the belief that he would do what is here charged, and the public have an interest in knowing whether or not the charge is true; the reviewer ought to produce the proof of it. General Schofield's reputation leads me to doubt the assertion, and as the records are open to the reviewer, I trust he will confirm his statement, if there is any proof which will sustain him.

We will return to the charge or intimation that Sherman obtained the order from Grant to enable him to reduce the Secretary of War to "the position of a mere clerk." The reviewer furnishes no proof that Sherman obtained this order, or that it was issued at his request; and the statement, therefore, is not supported by any records, official or otherwise.

I will, however, endeavor to explain this matter in the light of public history, which is tolerably well known to all who have taken any interest in our military affairs. A controversy as old as the government has existed between the line and the staff of the army, relating to the methods of military administration and government. This con-

troversy is important in many ways. It relates to the mode of command and government in the army, together with the relations that different branches of the service bear to each other. Without entering largely into the merits of this controversy in this connection, it is sufficient to observe that Grant and Sherman agreed substantially to the proposition that the staff officers should (with certain exceptions) be under the *immediate* control of the general-in-chief. The necessity of this, so far as the adjutant-general is concerned, was more apparent and pressing than as to the other officers referred to.

After the war was over, and General Grant removed his headquarters to Washington, he was more than ever impressed with the necessity of a change in the methods of transacting the business, relating to reports, orders, etc. He at once undertook the duty of making the necessary correction. With that purpose in view, he addressed to Secretary Stanton the following letter, which explains itself:

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1866.*

HON. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

From the period of the difficulties between Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Scott with Secretary Marcy, during the administration of President Polk, the command of the army virtually passed into the hands of the Secretary of War.

From that day to the breaking out of the rebellion, the general-in-chief never kept his headquarters in Washington, and could not consequently, with propriety, resume his proper functions. To administer the affairs of the army properly, headquarters and the adjutant-general's office must be in the same place.

During the war, whilst in the field, my functions as commander of all the armies was never impaired, but were facilitated in all essential matters by the administration and by the War Department. Now, however, that the war is over, and I have brought my headquarters to this city, I find my position embarrassing, and I think out of place.

I have been intending, or did intend, to make the beginning of the New Year the time to bring this matter before you, with a view of asking to have the old condition of affairs restored, but, from diffidence about mentioning the matter, have postponed it until now.

In a few words, I will state what I conceive to be my duties and my place, and ask respectfully to be restored to them and it.

The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entire control of the general-in-chief of the army. No orders should go to the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-in-chief.

Such as require the action of the President would be laid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regarded as those of the President. In short, in my opinion, the general-in-chief stands between the President and the army in all official matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through the general-in-chief) and the President.

I am very well convinced that a rule, so long disregarded, could not or would not be restored without the subject being presented, and I now do so, respectfully, for your consideration.

(Signed,)

U. S. GRANT,  
Lieutenant-General.

The difficulties which the Secretary of War had with President Johnson, are supposed to have prevented any action upon the request made in this communication. At all events, nothing definite came of it at that time. It is reproduced for the purpose of showing that General Grant, as far back as 1866, entertained well-defined views as to the duties of the "chief officer of the staff department"—viz., the adjutant-general; and the terms in which he expresses himself in this letter are almost identical with the terms of Order No. 11, above referred to. It is true, that in the *order* he directs *all* the chiefs of staff departments to report to and be under the immediate control of the general of the army, while in the *letter* he speaks only of the adjutant-general. The fact that the order is more comprehensive than the letter, shows that his experience at Washington had enlarged his views as to the necessity for a change in the forms of the rendition of reports, etc.

This letter and the order, taken in connection with the relation of the parties to them, conclusively contradict the statement of the reviewer, that Sherman obtained the order from Grant; on the contrary, they establish the fact that the change sought to be brought about was the result of Grant's own reflection. Sherman doubtless agreed with him in relation to this matter, and it is probable that most of our officers who have seen and felt the evils of the present methods, also agreed with them. It is further well known that General Grant stated at Chicago, in December after his election, but before his inauguration, that as soon as he was inaugurated he would issue the orders necessary to bring about the desired changes, and that Order No. 11 was

then in substance agreed upon. It has been shown that the order was issued the day after he became President—almost his first official act as commander-in-chief. In view of the facts appearing upon the face of the orders, and the history of the controversy referred to, the conduct of the reviewer in attacking General Sherman discloses a spirit which tends to utterly destroy the value of his judgment.

In view of the facts, however, that Grant and Sherman both agreed to the propriety of the orders referred to, it may be well to push the inquiry a step further to ascertain whether or not the reviewer is correct in his statement that the orders violate the law. If this should turn out to be the fact, whatever responsibility there is connected with it falls primarily upon the President and Secretary of War, and secondarily only upon Sherman, who is not shown to have been aware of any such violation.

It is, however, believed that the learned reviewer's legal conclusions touching this matter are erroneous.

His statement, on page 265, is that "General Rawlins called the attention of the President to the various violations of law involved in Sherman's order." "These," it is said, "were too plain to admit either of doubt or extended discussion." Whereupon, the order of March 27, rescinding the previous order, was issued by the President.

The looseness with which these statements are thrown together is evidence, either of great carelessness on the part of the reviewer, or of an intention to deceive his readers. His assertions are that the President's attention was called to the violations of law, in *Sherman's order*, and "that the President issued an order revoking those above." It is shown on the face of the "revoking order," that the President is revoking his own order (No. 11), and says nothing at all about Sherman's order (No. 12). This attempt at petty deception would not be noticed if it were not for the fact that it is so artfully arranged by the reviewer as to mislead the reader unless especial attention is directed to it. Order No. 11 is, it is true, published in the current series of army orders for that year, but it contained absolutely nothing relating to command, except the Presi-

dent's order of March 5th. It was an order directed to General Sherman, and through him to the army.

The attempt, therefore, that is here made by the reviewer to mislead and deceive the reader, by indicating that it is *Sherman's* order that is obnoxious instead of the President's, is enough to destroy whatever may be left of belief in his good faith or integrity of purpose.

Passing, however, from this, we will endeavor to ascertain whether he does show that the violations of law were "too plain to admit of either doubt or extended discussion." The theory of the reviewer's reasoning appears to be that the staff officers referred to were required by law and regulations to report directly to the Secretary of War, and therefore the direction requiring them to report to the commanding general violated such "law and regulations." If the orders referred to and the authorities cited are compared when applied to the facts to which they relate, it will be seen that they do not sustain the learned reviewer's conclusions. It is not disputed that both the President and Secretary of War are charged by law severally with certain duties which they must personally discharge. It is not necessary here to enumerate those duties; they are numerous and important, and can be readily ascertained by a reference to the acts of Congress. It is not claimed, that I am aware of, by any one, that when the law requires the President or Secretary personally to discharge a specific duty, its performance can be delegated to others.

It will be seen by referring to Orders Nos. 11 and 12 that they provide for this very exigency. The substance of the provisions in both orders is, that such official business as requires the action of the President or Secretary of War shall be laid before the Secretary of War by the general of the army. (Review, p. 264.)

From this, it appears that the general was to report to the Secretary of War all official business requiring his attention or that of the President. So that if this was not satisfactory to the Secretary of War, it raises the inference that he required official business to be submitted to him that he was not by law required to act upon. It

does not look very much like subordinating him to the position of clerk to require the commanding officer of the army to report to him.

It is difficult to determine what the reviewer means by the statements made in connection with this matter. I have shown: 1. That the order was issued by the President through the Secretary of War before Sherman was in command; 2. That the President had long entertained the views expressed in the order; 3. That all official business which requires his action, or that of the Secretary of War, should, in effect, be excepted from its operation; and finally, that the order was repealed within three weeks after its issue, without any protest being shown upon the part of General Sherman. The authorities cited by the reviewer tend merely to establish the following points:

1. That the orders issued by the Secretary of War to the army are to be presumed to be the President's orders. A proposition which no one denies.

2. That there are a number of statutes and regulations placing the chief officers of certain staff departments under the direction and control of the Secretary of War.

This proposition is also undisputed so far as I know. That this language, however, does not mean *immediately* under the secretary is apparent from the terms of other sections, which use the term "immediate" where it is intended to place the officers in that relation to him. (See sec. 220, p. 35, Revised Statutes.)

It is perhaps also true that a large number of these reports, etc., require the special action of the President or secretary. If they do, they are within the exception of the order which directs them to be submitted to the secretary, so that there is not even the pretense of an excuse left for the reviewer's assertion that the order contravened the law.

This subject being disposed of, attention is called to the charge of insubordination made by the reviewer against Sherman. The specification is that he stated to the military committee of the House that, as far as he had authority, he would carry out the views expressed by the commit-

tee (to the effect that the staff officers ought to be subordinated to the command of the general-in-chief the same as other officers of the army). The reviewer says that Sherman used this language after he had been expressly ordered by the President not to carry out "these identical views." Thus, by inference at least, charging him with insubordination. The confident manner of making this assertion is such as to lead the unsuspecting reader to presume at least that it rested upon some sort of foundation, and yet a moment's examination shows that it rests upon nothing at all.

The statement of Sherman is made in a report while he (Sherman) was acting as Secretary of War after the death of General Rawlins, and several months after the order rescinding Order No. 11 had been issued.

To prove that Sherman had been "expressly ordered" not to carry out the views which he expressed, the reviewer produces a paragraph of an existing order, in which it is directed by the President that official business requiring his attention or that of the Secretary of War should be submitted to the Secretary of War by the chiefs of the staff departments. From this order it appears that the business referred to was to be submitted to the Secretary of War by the officers named, instead of by the general of the army. One of two things is true—either General Sherman had authority to control those officers, or he had not. If he had authority to control them, it was his duty to exercise that authority in accordance with his judgment. If, however, there was doubt about his authority, then his reply is to be construed as merely stating that he would carry out the views of the committee *as far as he had authority*.

The reviewer misstates the fact when he says in this connection "that the President had expressly ordered Sherman not to carry out these identical views." No such order is shown, and there is no authority for this statement, except the paragraph at page 270 (above referred to). That direction is an order to other officers as to the discharge of *their* duties, and does not *expressly* refer to General Sherman at all. To make such an assertion as the reviewer

here makes upon such authority as he adduces is an abuse of language, which can be accounted for upon no hypothesis consistent with fair dealing and honesty of intention.

At page 263, the reviewer says: "That the removal of army headquarters to St. Louis resulted in a great degree from the fact that he (Sherman) could not bring himself to conform to this law." The reviewer again becomes confusing in his propositions. If this paragraph has any meaning at all, it is that Sherman would not be compelled "to conform to law" if headquarters were in St. Louis instead of Washington. This is a discovery which the reviewer ought not to be deprived of, and I shall not attempt to discuss it with him. If an officer can escape "conforming to the law" by removing to St. Louis, it will be well to have the fact generally understood, and I leave to the learned reviewer the pleasure of establishing the proposition he apparently puts forth.

The reviewer does not give any authority for the assertion that General Sherman removed his headquarters to St. Louis because he could not bring himself to conform to law, and after the exhibition of hostility which he has evinced in his book, it is hardly safe to accept his statements upon any topic where General Sherman is concerned.

Inasmuch as five years or more elapsed after the order in controversy was issued before headquarters were removed, the presumption would appear to contradict the assertion.

It is much more probable that the removal to St. Louis was effected after all due consideration was given to the subject, and that it was decided to be for the benefit of the service. Such a removal could only take place with the consent and approval of the President; and such approval by him ought to raise a presumption that it was done for the benefit of the army. This at least ought to be the conclusion until the contrary appears. The attempt, therefore, by the reviewer to make it appear that the removal in any way grew out of a disposition approaching insubordination is unsupported by any evidence.



There is one allegation which ought not to pass unnoticed. At page 266, Sherman is charged with violation of law in attaching ten officers to the general staff and six to his personal staff—sixteen in all—while the act of Congress only provided for six aids-de-camp. This charge is a mere play upon the meaning of words. The six aids mentioned in the act referred to, are to be assigned to duty upon his *personal* staff. No mention is made or limitation provided for the number of officers upon the *general* staff. The statements of the reviewer referring to this matter are calculated to mislead the reader.

It would seem that he did not understand the distinction between what is termed the general staff of the army and the aids which are attached to the personal staff of a commanding officer.

Whether the reviewer understood this distinction or not, it is recognized throughout our military legislation and is perfectly well understood in practice, and the terms of the act giving the general-in-chief six aids-de-camp, are such as to show that the officers of the general staff were not referred to.

The officers of the general staff above referred to being ordered to report to General Sherman by the President, were assigned to duty in accordance with their rank, each in his own staff department, and that is all there is of *this* asserted violation of law. It became Sherman's duty to assign them to their proper functions as soon as the President's order became obligatory upon him.

The reviewer says "that this did not differ in any material respect from what General Sheridan or any other general officer would be guilty of in issuing an order directing staff officers to report to him, who, by express provision of law, had been placed under the general of the army."

This illustration is incorrect, in this: General Sherman did not direct the staff officers referred to to report to himself. What was done by him was to assign these officers to duty upon receipt of the President's order, which directed them to report to him. The illustration would be more nearly correct if General Sheridan, or any other general of-

ficer, should assign officers of the general staff to duty after such officers were directed to report to him by the general of the army.

Having thus shown that the charges made by the reviewer against General Sherman in this chapter are without foundation, it may not be amiss to call attention to a few of the observations made in the Memoirs as to the military lessons of the war.

The substance of the views upon this topic is, that good government of the army requires that it should be a unit for action; that commanding officers should be hampered by forms just as little as possible, and that all portions of the army should be governed alike. That this is not the case in our army was fully demonstrated during the war, and is in substance stated by General Grant in his letter to Secretary Stanton. (Ante, p. 74.) An attempt was made to remedy this evil when he (Grant) became acting Secretary of War in 1867-8.

It will be remembered that, pursuant to an act of Congress, a board of military officers was convened during that winter, consisting of Sherman, Sheridan, and Augur, who were directed to revise the regulations for the purpose of submitting them to Congress. A report was made, which was approved by General Grant and submitted to Congress. This report corrected, or attempted to do so, many of the evils which have long existed to the detriment of the service, growing out of the fact that the regulations do not clearly define the duties of the various officers who are charged with the performance of them. This evil can not be thoroughly corrected without a revision of the regulations by Congress.

Another of the difficulties seems to be a lack of that unity so desirable in all business operations, which in the army become a necessity where promptness is required.

The reviewer appears to be of the opinion that the adjutant-general is a staff officer to the Secretary of War; at least one of the authorities he cites appears to be for the

purpose of establishing that proposition. The practice at the War Department seems to justify that such is the view of the law at that office.<sup>1</sup>

The revised statutes provide in substance that military power shall be transmitted from one military officer to another, and there is no provision of law making the Secretary of War a military officer. Hence it would seem that he has no legal power to command such officers; and yet it appears from General Grant's letter that the entire control of the army has passed into the hands of the Secretary of War.

It seems from statements made in this connection that the secretary controls the army, and that without being himself under military control he manages to command it without the authority of law and without the responsibility which attaches to military rank in the army.

Pending the controversy between President Johnson and Secretary Stanton, an attempt was made by the former to prevent orders being sent in his name to the army by the latter, and General Grant was directed by the Presi-

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<sup>1</sup>I am induced to state this because the form of an order now before me (lately issued by the War Department), convening a general court-martial, seems to indicate that such is the view of the law, at the war office. The theory seems to be this: That the President has power to convene a general court-martial; that therefore the Secretary of War can convene such a court; that, as he has power to convene the court, he may delegate that power to the adjutant-general. The order accordingly proceeds in the usual form, directing the formation of the court; at its conclusion it is signed by an officer of the adjutant-general's bureau, who states that it is issued "by order of the Secretary of War." The question as to the legality of the court at once presents itself. To determine this, the authority of the officer creating it must be ascertained. If he is not legally invested with that power, any one convicted by that court would be discharged.

The President is not *expressly* authorized to convene such a court, except in certain contingencies (not shown to exist in the present order). Conceding, however, that he has an implied authority to do so (a proposition not at all clear), an order issued by the Secretary would doubtless be held to be the President's order, and therefore valid; but it is believed that the delegation of power could go no further. That while the Secretary may issue orders which are in law the President's, he can not delegate that power to an army officer, so as to empower him to issue orders in the form above mentioned.

dent not to obey orders issued at the war office without first ascertaining that they really were authorized by the President. This General Grant declined to do, alleging that the Secretary of War had stated to him that he (the Secretary) had received no orders of a similar import from the President; therefore it was to be presumed by him (Grant) that the orders from the War Department were the President's orders, although it was in fact known that such was not the case.

Thus the President found himself unable to control the secretary in the exercise of powers vested in him (the President) by the constitution. These facts are referred to for the purpose of illustrating the necessity of revising the regulations governing the army and removing all doubts and uncertainty; whereas, while such doubts and uncertainties remain, there will continue to be color at least for the opinion that the various bureaus of the War Department are absorbing all the functions of government and command of the army. Thus that jealousy of the army which impairs its usefulness will continue. It is difficult to understand why there should be any objection from any direction to defining the powers of all officers correctly; and now that there is no war on hand nor anticipated, is the time to apply the remedy.

## CONCLUSION.

The true value of such memoirs as those of General Sherman consists in the fact that they present events as they appeared to him at the time they occurred. This value is not essentially changed by the circumstance that his opinions thus given agree or disagree with our own. It is valuable for us to know how an officer looked upon events in which he was a prominent actor.

This is true, even if we are confident that his opinions are erroneous. All we should expect, and what we have a right to demand, is that such memoirs should present pictures truthfully. We should not expect them to be so framed as to suit our preconceived views of the matters narrated, nor should we expect such narratives to be free from the tinge of personal feeling. They would not be likely to be truthful if they were clear of such shading.

The personal allusions in Sherman's Memoirs may possibly for a time create some feeling among those who are too much or too little noticed in them, but a little reflection will show that to have commented properly upon all the good deeds of his brother officers would have required more space than properly belonged to his task. Such notices many of his companions deserve; but to do full justice to each, would require a volume in their behalf.

In determining whether or not the Memoirs are unduly tinged with personal feelings, they should be compared with other performances of a similar character, rather than with the narrations of events made long subsequent to their occurrence, and after the prominent actors are dead. The truth of history is difficult to obtain at all times, and especially so where the narration takes place a considerable period subsequent to the occurrences attempted to be related. In addition to this, it is apt to be the case that most histories are tinged with the personal or political views of the writer, or of the party to which he belonged. Without such explanations as are to be found in personal narratives

or memoirs, it becomes next to impossible for us, of the present generation, to fully comprehend the historical narratives of the preceding one.

If General Sherman's Memoirs are compared with those of General Scott, published just previous to the latter's death, it will be found that the latter are much more open to the charge of being personal than are those of Sherman; so also of the memoirs of John Quincy Adams, lately edited by his son, Charles Francis Adams. These memoirs contain a free criticism upon the conduct of most of the men with whom their distinguished author held personal or official relations. Had they been published in the lifetime of Mr. Adams, and of the parties referred to, it is probable that much complaint would have resulted. It is possible that here and there unintentional errors are to be found in the statements of Mr. Adams. Even if this can be shown, it is not a solid argument against them. The truth they give far overbalances the minor errors that may be found.

The memoirs of Napoleon were published in London (1823, seven volumes). They were highly personal, containing numerous allusions of a very pointed character, relating to officers and others high in rank and popularity. This publication called forth a mass of complaining letters. In the subsequent editions of the work these letters were published, and thus a new element of value was added to the history of the events of that period. It is not too much to say that Napoleon's memoirs, with the letters which they brought forth, materially modified the views which the students of history had previously entertained concerning the events therein discussed.

Should a second edition of Sherman's Memoirs be called for, it is to be hoped that he will pursue a similar course, and publish all the letters which have been written to him by officers and others, complaining that injustice has been done to them in the present edition. Such a course will present both views of the case to the public, and enable readers to draw their own conclusions. The history of

Napoleon's memoirs illustrates how desirable it is to have such works published while the persons referred to are alive, and therefore able to state their own views of the events narrated.





THE REVIEW  
OF  
General Sherman's Memoirs  
EXAMINED,

CHIEFLY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE.

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CINCINNATI, O.

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












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